Republic of India

Submission on Consideration of Outputs of the First Global Stocktake

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Section – I

I. Preliminary Observations

India is pleased to make this submission on the elements for the consideration of outputs component of the First Global Stocktake (GST), and welcomes this opportunity to provide its views on this subject matter in furtherance to the draft conclusions proposed by the Chairs of the Subsidiary Bodies (SBs) in FCCC/SB/2023/L.3, Para 8 (a)[1], which reads as follows –

> ***8. … (a) Invited Parties and non-Party stakeholders to submit their views on the elements for the consideration of outputs component by 15 September 2023 via the submission portal, taking into consideration the informal note referred to in paragraph 7[2] above;***

2. At the outset, India wishes to state that this political consideration of outputs, as the final stage of the GST process, will mark the conclusion of a historic moment in the climate change sphere. Noting that it is a "consideration" phase of the GST process, it is critical in ensuring the desired impact expected from the First GST.

3. The First GST is expected to be a call for sustained efforts to create a safer, sustainable world. Country-Parties are expected to use the outputs from the First GST and look domestically to **increase and strengthen their ambition** and **update their NDCs**.

II. Science

1. The latest reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), pursuant to decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 99 were included as a major source of input for the GST.[3]

2. The First GST coincides with the sixth assessment cycle of the IPCC. The latest science, i.e. the IPCC Synthesis of the Sixth Assessment Report (AR6-SYR), 2023, gave the following key findings –

- Despite progress, **adaptation gaps exist**, and will continue to grow at current rates of implementation.

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[1] Accessed at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/sb2023_L03E.pdf

[2] Indicative draft structure for GST1 CMA5 decision; accessed at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/IN.SBI58.i7_SBSTA58.i8.4.pdf

[3] Para 37(b), decision 19/CMA.1

- **Adaptation options** that are feasible and effective today **will become constrained and less effective with increasing global warming**. With increasing global warming, losses and damages will increase and additional human and natural systems will reach adaptation limits.
- Adaptation outcomes are enhanced by increased support to regions and people with the highest vulnerability to climatic hazards.
- Human-caused climate change is already affecting many weather and climate extremes in every region across the globe. **Vulnerable communities who have historically contributed the least to current climate change are disproportionately affected.**
- Human activities, principally through emissions of GHGs, have unequivocally caused global warming, with global surface temperature reaching 1.1°C above 1850–1900 in 2011–2020.
- Based on global modelled pathways and assumptions, the AR6 states that "Global GHG emissions are projected to peak between 2020 and at the latest before 2025 in global modelled pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot and in those that limit warming to 2°C and assume immediate action."[4]

  [Note: India has highlighted that Equity completely absent in the IPCC AR6 Global Modelled Scenarios in WG-III and SYR-AR6 and weak qualifiers in both Reports do not capture the extent of inequitable regional outcomes underlying the global scenarios.[5]]
- **Finance flows fall short** of the levels needed to meet climate goals across all sectors and regions.
- **Finance, technology and international cooperation are critical enablers for accelerated climate action**. If climate goals are to be achieved, both adaptation and mitigation financing would need to increase manifold. Enhancing technology innovation systems is key to accelerate the widespread adoption of technologies and practices.
- **Prioritizing equity, climate justice, social justice, inclusion and just**

[4] Para 33; G20 New Delhi Leaders' Declaration (2023); accessed at: https://www.g20.org/content/dam/gtwenty/gtwenty_new/document/G20-New-Delhi-Leaders-Declaration.pdf

[5] The IPCC affirms this omission with the following statement in the Summary for Policymakers of the Synthesis Report (SPM SYR-AR6) that notes: *Modelled scenarios and pathways are used to explore future emissions, climate change, related impacts and risks, and possible mitigation and adaptation strategies and are based on a range of assumptions, including socioeconomic variables and mitigation options. These are quantitative projections and are neither predictions nor forecasts. Global modelled emission pathways, including those based on cost effective approaches contain regionally differentiated assumptions and outcomes, and have to be assessed with the careful recognition of these assumptions. Most do not make explicit assumptions about global equity, environmental justice or intraregional income distribution. IPCC is neutral with regard to the assumptions underlying the scenarios in the literature assessed in this report, which do not cover all possible futures.*

Source: Box SPM.1 The use of scenarios and modelled pathways in the AR6 Synthesis Report; accessed at: https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/syr/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_SYR_SPM.pdf

transition processes can enable adaptation and ambitious mitigation actions and climate resilient development.

- Many options are available for **reducing emission-intensive consumption**, including through behavioural and lifestyle changes, with co-benefits for societal well-being.

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Section – II

III. Transition to the Political Phase of the First GST

1. Expectations from the Political Phase of the First GST

(i) Para 3(c), decision 19/CMA.1 states – *"global stocktake will consist of the following components … Consideration of outputs, focusing on discussing the implications of the findings of the technical assessment with a view to achieving the outcome of the global stocktake of informing Parties in updating and enhancing, in a nationally determined manner, their actions and support, in accordance with relevant provisions of the Paris Agreement, as well as in enhancing international cooperation for climate action."*

(ii) The Paris Agreement makes global climate action responsive to scientific, technological, and policy developments. Review of all climate actions of Parties, including mitigation, adaptation and the means of implementation and support with global stocktakes every five years from 2023, began with the idea to drive further ambition. It is a "learning by doing" format, and in developing the GST modalities, the endeavour is to **ensure** that these stocktakes provide opportunities to identify gaps; reflect on the latest scientific knowledge, leverage new technology and best practices, and ultimately facilitate greater cooperation.

(iii) This phase demands astute craftsmanship from Parties in delivering the elements of a draft decision for the First GST, which should be able to answer, ***"What is Enhanced Climate Action?"*** It is more than just an identification of opportunities, challenges, measures, and best practices, which formed a part of the Technical Assessment phase, which was concluded at the SB-58 at Bonn, Germany in June 2023.

(iii) This phase is about key political asks and outcomes to be incorporated into a COP decision, which will document for all Parties, a future course of action, to adopt and inform all climate actions, until **2028**, the year for the second GST. 2028, does not give Parties adequate wiggle room, ever since the IPCC 2018 Special Report on 1.5°C indicated that cutting CO_2 emissions to 45% by **2030**, compared to 2010 levels, is critical to meeting the Paris Agreement goal of limiting temperature rise to 1.5°C by the end of this century and avoiding the worst impacts of climate change, including more frequent and severe droughts, heatwaves and rainfall.

2. What is Enhanced Climate Action?

(i) The First GST should be able to answer, ***"What is understood by Enhanced Climate Action?"*** The Paris Agreement makes climate resilience a global objective and a core element of the international climate regime. For the achievement of the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement, global transformational climate action is needed.

(ii) Achieving these goals will require the PA to be implemented to not only ensure that countries' commitments are fulfilled but also lift the level of climate action ambition and mobilize necessary support from the developed countries to the developing countries.

(iii) The agreed classification of countries under the UNFCCC and its Paris Agreement is as developed and developing country Parties. India does not support any other classification of developing countries like partner governments, including "major emitters", "G20 partners" and "other developing and emerging economies." These classifications overlook national circumstances and replace considerations of equity and CBDR-RC in terms of climate actions.

(iv) There is a need for broad **ownership and inclusiveness** of GST. Given that the First GST is one of the most consequential stocktakes to be undertaken, it needs to be broadly owned by policymakers in terms of the impact it needs to create for effective enhanced climate action and support, informing ambition, and furthering international cooperation.

(v) GST must create adequate **political momentum** that it inspires and accelerates climate action and motivates change. It should not only tell governments where they should be, but also where they could be, if all policies were aligned.

(vi) GST should not only help generate greater attention towards the enhancement of climate change actions but bring political and economic consensus. Besides showcasing the collective progress and efforts taken by the Parties, it should take stock of forward-looking components (carbon budget, support needed, and gaps in the support provided).

(vi) The aforesaid must be the primary tools for assessing efforts and stress on greater need for mitigation and support for climate action from developed countries.

(viii) The Outcome should be brought forward for the consideration and endorsement of the CMA and ultimately lead to a decision that enables the enhancement of the political commitment of Parties, based on equity and scientifically sound pathways – even if emanating from the IPCC.

<u>Section – III</u>

IV. First GST Outcome

1. Expectations from the First GST Outcome

(i) By establishing a global stocktake at five-year intervals, the Paris Agreement establishes a process where Parties enhance their **actions and support**, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Agreement. As discussions progressed, this translated into countries putting forward, progressively more ambitious NDCs every five years (in a bottom-up approach), creating a dynamic regime, informed by a global stocktake to advance climate action on a regular basis. The level of ambition represented in these successive contributions will be critical to determining the ultimate success of Parties' efforts to combat climate change.

(ii) Consideration on how to incorporate both "best available" science and equity, as not only the guiding and overarching concerns, but also in each component of the GST, is a matter that has still not found fruition.

(iii) The mechanism of GST envisages making a collective (and facilitative) assessment of progress of climate change action by the Parties to the Paris Agreement. **GST should therefore not make individual assessments of Parties' actions. [Emphasis Supplied]**

(iv) The recognition of equity as a core component of GST provides a unique opportunity to develop guidance on key criteria and metrics (i.e. Equity indicators) that evaluate the fairness and equity of climate contributions based on national circumstances and capabilities. This guidance should be drawn from the criteria and metrics / indicators already communicated voluntarily by Parties in their NDCs.

(v) India has always maintained that Equity is an important component for preserving the collective and facilitative nature of GST, therefore a commonly agreed guidance to operationalize Equity needs to be designed in the GST, through inclusive equity indicators arrived at by Parties. Equity needs to be captured not only as an overarching but also a cross cutting issue in each and every element of the GST outcome. This aspect is still under discussion and remains inconclusive. Developed Countries maintain that there is no mandate from the Paris Agreement to discuss issues pertaining to Operationalization of Equity, in addition to neglecting discussions on Assessment of Gaps, Pre-2020 Actions, Historical Responsibility, and Carbon Budget.

(vi) Since the GST is mandated to have an informative outcome, it should simplify the complex information needs required towards the implementation of the Paris Agreement. This is more-so because, the cyclical nature of the GST connects the contributions by country Parties to the achievement of the Paris Agreement's long-term goals. Thus, the impact of GST, to a large extent, determines the lasting impact of the Paris Agreement itself.

(vii) Article 14.3 reflects a careful (yet precarious) balance between how much should be nationally determined and how much should be driven by potential international actions.

(viii) In order to secure an effective and ambitious outcome, GST may be driven by the following six objectives:

- **a.** Update Parties, not only on their collective progress towards – or away from – the long-term global goals, but also on the successes, opportunities, and potential barriers to overcome.
- **b.** Equally highlight and recognize ambitious efforts that have been scaled up by various Parties.

- **c.** Developed Country Parties must lead in the ambition of their actions and support, and their efforts to achieve and / or exceed their NDCs commitments.
- **d.** Support Developing Country Parties by identifying means and areas for enhanced international cooperation and strengthened capacity to enable them to adapt and go beyond their intended actions.
- **e.** Create a productive, cooperative, environment, of sharing of best practices and also mobilization of means of implementation and support in terms of finance; technology transfer and development; and capacity building.
- **f.** Recognize that sustainable lifestyles and sustainable patterns of consumption and production, with developed country Parties taking the lead, play an important role in addressing climate change, and note the importance of transition to sustainable lifestyles and sustainable patterns of consumption and production for efforts to address climate change.

2. Scope of the First GST's outcome

(i) Article 4.9 of the Paris Agreement states that *"Parties shall…be informed by the outcome of the GST."* Therefore, an effective and robust operationalization of the outcome of GST will therefore be the opportunity through which scaling up of all climate actions, including mitigation, adaptation, and means of implementation and support provided, and greater levels of international cooperation will be achieved.

(ii) Article 4.9 of the Paris Agreement also indicates that, *"Parties shall…be informed by the outcome of the GST,"* and not 'NDCs shall be informed by the outcome of the GST.' Furthermore, Article 14.3 of the Paris Agreement indicates that, *"the outcome of the GST shall inform Parties in enhancing and updating their actions and support, as appropriate."* **[Emphasis Supplied]**

(iii) In view of the above, the provisions of Paris Agreement do not stipulate a clear, specific, and direct linkage between the Outcome of the GST and any enhancement, adjustment, and / or update, an individual Country Party may make with respect to its existing NDCs and / or subsequent NDCs.

(iv) Scope of the GST process encompasses all climate actions i.e. mitigation, adaptation, means of implementation and support (in terms of finance, technology transfer and development, and capacity building). As the consideration of outputs is done as per the three thematic areas – Mitigation (including Response Measures); Adaptation (including Loss and Damage); and Means of Implementation and Support, however, they will encompass all the goals of the Paris Agreement, which are not limited to Articles 2.1 (a) – (c), but are also to be understood in terms of Articles 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12.

(v) Furthermore, it is important that care is taken in assimilating Equity within GST. Therefore, the goals of the Paris Agreement must be read in light of Article 2.2 of the Paris Agreement. It needs to be understood, that an aggregate assessment of progress has to be made, based in Equity, of all climate actions, therefore, scope of GST should include the full Article 2, and not just Article 2.1 of the Paris Agreement.

(iv) Article 14.3 of the Paris Agreement provides that the GST Outcome needs to be Informative. Therefore, it must –

- update Parties, not only on their collective progress toward – or away from – the global goals, but also on the successes, opportunities, and potential barriers to overcome;
- equally highlight and recognize ambitious efforts that have been scaled up by various parties;
- deliver practical information that can be considered and used by Parties for future climate actions, in a nationally determined manner;
- focus on positive communication – assessment of good practices, experiences, technology innovation, and potential cooperative opportunities;
- be encouraging, but not prescriptive;
- motivate developed country Parties to increase the ambition of their actions and support, and their efforts to achieve or exceed NDCs;
- inform the delivery of support and technical assistance through the Financial Mechanism, Technology Mechanism, and Paris Committee on Capacity Building;
- support developing country Parties by identifying means and areas for enhanced cooperation and strengthened capacity to enable them to adapt and go beyond their intended actions;
- highlight the developing countries' needs for support in finance, technology development and transfer, and capacity building to enhance their climate actions;
- ensure overall clarity on the support provided by the developed countries to the developing countries, including the aggregate financial support, proof of support in technology transfer and development, and a review of the support provided for meeting adaptation goals;
- illustrate the gaps in means of implementation due to shortfall of the support in finance, technology development and transfer, and capacity building, and what are the roadblocks in providing such support by the developed countries;
- be embedded in the principles of CBDR-RC and Equity – especially how they are being taken into account in developing countries' collective efforts to attain the long-term goals under Article 2 of the Paris Agreement i.e. sustainable development and poverty eradication; supported by the developed countries through adequate means of implementation and support provided;
- serve as a reference point to Parties, for identifying their follow-up actions to strengthen international cooperation in addressing climate change.

(v) For India, informed by the outcome of GST –

- The developed countries must show visible leadership, as envisaged under Article 4.4 of the Paris Agreement in –
  - increasing ambition to reduce their emissions, in line with their historical

    responsibility in addressing climate change;
  - providing support to developing countries towards finance, technology development and transfer, and capacity building;
- The developing countries will concentrate on enhancing their mitigation and adaptation actions, taking into account their national circumstances, capacities and increased finance, technology and capacity-building support received, and in context of –
  - sustainable development and poverty eradication;
  - the global goal of adaptation;
  - support provided by the developed countries.

3. Elements of the First GST's outcome

3.1 Mitigation

3.1.1 Pre-2020 Actions and Commitments

(i) Pre-2020 actions generally refer to the range of actions under mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology development and transfer, and capacity building to be taken before 2020. COP-17 at Durban unfolded a process to make *a new and universal climate agreement* which will enter into force in 2020. The new agreement will come into force post 2020, and Parties underscored the need for action before 2020. Therefore, COP-18 at Doha in 2012 adopted an amendment in the Kyoto Protocol, making provision for the second commitment period of the Kyoto protocol valid from 2013 to 2020. The Parties agreed to revisit the second commitment period by 2014, to raise it from 18 per cent to at least 25 to 40 per cent below 1990 levels by 2020.[6]

(ii) To assess whether tangible progress on provision of finance, technology development and transfer, and capacity building has been made, in terms of what was already committed, assessment of progress towards Pre 2020 commitments is crucial. Therefore, the First GST cannot ignore the pledges from the previous implementation period, which in this would be the Cancun pledges, Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs), the USD 100 billion commitment per year by 2020, and the commitments under the Kyoto Protocol including the Doha Amendment. Under decision 19/CMA.1 Para 37 (a), Parties have given GST the scope to assess the implementation of Pre-2020 commitment under the Convention. This also covers the financial, technological, and capacity building support provided by developed countries, as well as assessment of Pre-2020

[6] **Source:** FCCC/KP/CMP/2012/L.9; Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol; Para 7 of the Draft Decision Text; 8 December 2012 – *"Decides that each Party included in Annex I will revisit its quantified emission limitation and reduction commitment for the second commitment period at the latest by 2014. In order to increase the ambition of its commitment, such Party may decrease the percentage inscribed in the third column of Annex B of its quantified emission limitation and reduction commitment, in line with an aggregate reduction of greenhouse gas emissions not controlled by the Montreal Protocol by Parties included in Annex I of at least 25 to 40 per cent below 1990 levels by 2020."*

ambition gaps (in terms of in mitigation; adaptation; means of implementation and support; emission reduction etc.), to avoid unfair transfer of mitigation burden to developing countries in the Post-2020 climate action period.

(iii) The following observations need to come out of the consideration of outputs on Pre 2020 actions and commitments –

- That Annex-I countries are the only ones with binding Pre-2020 commitments.
- There is serious lack of ambition from the Annex-I parties, which is evident from the gaps in the Pre-Paris era in terms of mitigation and its implications for the mitigation burden after 2020.
- That there is a gap between equitable share of global carbon space to developing countries against the physical share that accessible to them because Annex-I countries have historically and at present consumed vast proportions of allotted carbon budget disproportionately.
- That Equity can only be achieved if developing countries are provided access to technology and finance, and development space to developing countries.
- Science-based information on whether the Annex-I countries are on a low-carbon and climate-resilient pathway, or do they require a course correction. For instance, have the Annex-I countries invested in low-carbon and low-emissions development technologies?
- The analysis of progress should go beyond identifying the gaps in emissions, options may be provided for bridging this gap by providing information on effectiveness of policies, identification of best practices and technology needs, and providing options for scaling-up ambition by the developed country Parties.
- That climate action is linked with economic development and historical responsibility for Annex-I countries to catalyze higher levels of ambition towards meeting their unfulfilled commitments, not only towards mitigating emissions but also progress on adaptation, the commitment of developed countries to take the lead in climate actions, and increased investment in terms of finance, and technology transfer and development to developing countries.
- That in the next 10 years, emissions from Annex-I countries is predicted to reduce by only 2.2 to 5.8%.[7] Emissions of developed countries have increased and are at a considerable distance from returning to the 1990 levels. Declarations of future neutrality without requisite policies and measures, in context of 'with existing measures' (WEM) and 'with additional measures' (WAM) scenarios cannot be the basis of judging where we stand

[7] **Source:** UNFCCC Secretariat, ***Assessing the overall aggregated effects of steps taken by Parties on mitigation*** (November 2020), Slide 4 presented at the Pre 2020 Rountable at the November Climate Dialogues, 2020, available at

https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/2.1%202020_CD_GST_InputsOnMitigation_26%20Nov%20ver.pdf today.[8]

(iv) Pre-2020 is the foundation upon which climate actions must be built, and as such, Pre-2020 gaps should be addressed as a matter of priority with a view to advancing long-term climate action and protecting the integrity of the Paris Agreement. It is an iterative process. There is a need to reaffirm the objectives, principles, and provisions of the Convention, in particular the principles of Equity and CBDR-RC, keeping in view the process of enhanced action in the Pre-2020 period.

(v) Parties need to recall the relevant COP decisions (namely 1/CP.17, 1/CP.18, 1/CP.19, and 1/CP.20), recognizing the need to operationalize paragraphs 3 and 4 of Decision 1/CP.19, and paragraphs 17 and 18 of Decision 1/CP.20.[9] Decision 1/CP.21 at COP-21 facilitated the Pre-2020 actions, by enhancing the Technical Examination Process (TEM)[10] to bring out quantified emissions reduction, and the appointment of high-level support[11]. However, the implementation of the decision still lacks ambition and the Pre-2020 commitments remain unfulfilled. These past decisions have been urging Parties to enhance their ambition, with Developed Country Parties taking the lead, and providing the required means of implementation and support to the Developing Countries Parties. **[Emphasis Supplied]**

(vi) India views Pre-2020 as an issue of **enhancement of ambition** and effective implementation of the existing provisions of the Convention and its Paris Agreement (which was entered into for enhancing the implementation of the Convention, including its objective, aims to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change, in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty).

3.1.2 Leadership by developed Country-Parties

(i) Developed countries' GHG emissions were projected to increase slightly between 2017 and 2020 and then decrease by a **meagre 2.2% between 2020 and 2030**, suggesting the need for stronger policies and actions – supported by legislative and institutional frameworks – that will effectively and irreversibly change the trajectory of emissions.[12] Continued pursuit of unsustainable growth in

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[8] **Source:** UNFCCC Secretariat; ***Projections of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Removals: An Introductory Guide for Practitioners***; accessed at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2021-11/358238_Projections%20of%20Greenhouse%20Gas%20Emissions%20and%20Removals_An%20Introductory%20Guide%20for%20Practitioners.pdf

[9] In fact, for this purpose, at COP-21, the need to conduct a Facilitated Dialogue (Paragraph 115, Decision 1/CP.21) was also recognized, to be held in COP22.

[10] Paras 120 and 121, Decision 1/CP.21

[11] Para 121, Decision 1/CP.21, two high-level champions shall be appointed to act on behalf of the COP Presidency for Pre-2020 actions

[12] **Source:** ***Paving the Way For the Success of the Paris Agreement : Climate action and support before 2020***; accessed at: https://newsroom.unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/UNFCCC_C_an_-S_Brochure-web.pdf

high-income developed countries is at odds with the climate change and equity commitments of the Paris Agreement.

(ii) Climate Change is measured in terms of cumulative historical emissions since 1850 to present day. The atmospheric levels of CO_2 are estimated to be 415 parts per million (this is the concentration of CO_2 in the atmosphere) and global temperatures have already risen 1.1°C over pre-industrial levels. However, all countries have not contributed to this rise. The Paris Agreement (which is meant to enhance the implementation of the Convention) recognizes that those developed countries who are most responsible for GHGs emissions must provide support to the developing countries in line with their historical responsibility. The Global North countries are responsible for the largest percentage of cumulative overshoot in emissions historically. The UNFCCC placed responsibility on developed and developing countries for actions on the basis of historical emissions and the principles of equity and CBDR-RC. The Convention mandates developed countries to support climate change actions in developing countries taking into account their historical and current contribution to the stock of GHGs in the atmosphere.

(iii) Playing the Devils' Advocate – equality in tackling the burden of combating climate change is contextualized and supported by the notion of responsibility. Industrialized countries' historical contribution to climate change, also come with advances in science and technology that flowed from the process of industrialization. However, Equal sharing of the mitigation burden between developed and developing countries is unfair and inequitable when the respective responsibilities for atmospheric GHG concentrations are accounted for. Differential contributions to environmental degradation, greater capabilities on the part of the developed countries, and commitment to international cooperation – are all consistent with a broad understanding of what is fair or equitable. Hence, it is considered unfair if those who have contributed the most to the problem do not contribute more to the solution than those whose contribution is much smaller. Similarly, in the face of a problem demanding a collective solution, it would be unfair to expect those with the least resources to commit a higher share to the solution of the problem.

(iv) Under the Convention, it was agreed that all Annex-I Country Parties will work towards stabilizing the greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in the atmosphere with the emissions reduction target below 1990 levels by 2020 i.e. to keep average global temperatures from rising above the pre-industrial level, while at the same time preserving the Developing Country Parties' right to sustainable development by providing means of implementation and support, especially towards adaptation. The outcome of the GST needs to acknowledge that Paris Agreement adopts a differentiation-based approach (building on the Convention), for instance – Article 4.4 clearly differentiates between developed and developing country Parties with respect to their emission reduction actions, as *"developed country Parties should continue taking the lead in undertaking economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets"* while *"developing country Parties should continue enhancing their mitigation efforts"* and be *"encouraged to move over time towards economy wide emission reduction or limitation targets in the light of* *different national circumstances."*

(v) The developed countries should fulfil what is already committed and must ensure no undue burden continues to overflow on to the developing countries in the Post-2020. Keeping in view the principles of CBDR-RC, Equity, and Climate Justice, the developed country parties must show alacrity for achieving what was already committed and to enhancing commitments. What was likely has already happened and the Pre-2020 commitments at the aggregate level have not been met both in terms of mitigation and provision of means of implementation and support. This shortfall persists in 2023, and will continue to persist post the conclusion of the First GST. Therefore, the First GST cannot ignore the pledges from the previous implementation period, i.e. the Cancun pledges, NAMAs, and the USD 100 billion commitment per year by 2020.

(vi) As stated before, the First GST must explain **Ambition** in a comprehensive manner, by clearly bringing out leadership of developed countries towards more ambitious climate change actions (specifically in relation to implementation and support provided towards finance; technology development and transfer; and capacity building). Since the developed countries **lead** in their current and historical levels of energy consumption and emissions, therefore they must also lead in their efforts in addressing issues arising from and pertaining to climate change. The GST outcome must reflect greater detailing of this issue in particular. This is vital for the following reasons –

- to allow developing countries the carbon space to meet their development needs;
- to reflect the equitable sharing of the global carbon budget (in line with the historical responsibilities of the developed countries);
- to ensure ambition and inform the next cycle of actions and support,
- to operationalize Equity in the Paris Agreement;
- to promote global climate change actions, in context of poverty eradication, sustainable development, economic diversification efforts, and elimination of gaps in social & economic development between developed and developing countries; and
- attain the just and equitable transition of the workforce alongside sustainable development.[13]

(vii) The large volume of historical emissions by the Annex – I Parties, over and above their equitable share in cumulative emissions by any measure, cannot be ignored. Climate science is based on the concept of carbon budget; whose quantum

[13] The Synthesis Report of the Technical Dialogue of the First GST has observed that – *"Just transition is need to create decent work and quality jobs and protect the communities that depend on them.* ***All countries are expected to explain in their NDCs how their NDCs are fair and ambitious."***

Source: Key finding 7; Technical dialogue of the first global stocktake Synthesis report by the co-facilitators on the technical dialogue; accessed at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/sb2023_09_adv.pdf

depends on the corresponding temperature target. The fact that emissions must reach net zero is part of the definition of 'carbon budget.' It is already widely recognized in the scientific literature that to implement Equity under the UNFCCC and its Paris Agreement, the equitable sharing of the global carbon budget is necessary[14], and therefore achieving net zero by Parties in the second half of this century in accordance to Article 4.1 of the Paris Agreement. Developing Countries need their share in the ***atmosphere***, to enable them to address their developmental goals, keeping with the tenets and principle of CBDR-RC. However, considerations of the First GST outcome cannot restrict itself to future mitigation, thereby completely overlooking historical responsibility and Pre-2020 emissions. For instance, the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways used as basis of the analysis in WGII[15] (AR6-WG-II) and WGIII[16] (AR6-WG-III) are "least- cost" pathways that pointedly set equity aside. Reports based on future projections, repeatedly asserted by developed countries, are based on pathways that do not consider equity but on assumptions of future targets, decades ahead and delay immediate action. The First GST must shift focus from distant net zero targets to real emissions reductions now. If progress under the UNFCCC and its Paris Agreement is to take place equitably, then enough conversation has been done on future net zero. The First GST outcome must discuss the need for Annex – I Parties to lead and attain real and substantial reductions first in the context of the long-term temperature goal of the Paris Agreement, based on Equity and CBDR-RC, before stressing on declarations of future neutrality.

(viii) Obligations of States under the climate change multilateral arrangement, is determined, in terms of large volume of historical emissions from which many countries have benefited during decades of unrestricted high-carbon development. According to the Paris Agreement the developed countries are required to take lead in climate action in terms of mitigation, adaptation, and means of implementation and support towards finance, technology development and transfer and capacity building, and are encouraged to take stock of their historical responsibility.

(ix) Historical responsibility is a sound approach, because no one is answering the question: *"How did we get here?"* and because it determines capacity of country parties to take climate action, based on increase in incomes and relative proportion of accumulated emissions through sectoral economic transformations. Total financial compensation due to undershooting countries or countries who have used less than their fair share of the global carbon budget, decreases when

[14] **Source:** IPCC, 2018: Summary for Policymakers. In: *Global Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty*; accessed at: https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2022/06/SPM_version_report_LR.pdf

[15] **Source:** IPCC Sixth Assessment Report Working Group II: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability; accessed at: https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/

[16] **Source:** IPCC Sixth Assessment Report Working Group III: Mitigation of Climate Change; accessed at: https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg3/

historical responsibility for atmospheric appropriation is forgiven or worse forgotten by not assessing cumulative emissions for the Pre-2020 period or from a later start date.

(x) The argument of fair share has important implications because some countries have appropriated more than their fair shares of the carbon budget, and hence other countries must effectively forgo the full use of their own fair shares to keep the world on track for "well below 2°C and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C, mitigating more rapidly than would otherwise be required.

(xi) It is reiterated that under the UNFCCC, Articles 4.1, 4.8, 4.9, 4.10, 5, 6, and 12.1 are common obligations applicable to all Parties, while Articles 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 12.2 and 12.3 are differentiated obligations that apply only to developed country Parties. Additionally, the Kyoto Protocol that was adopted in 1997 provided further detail to flesh out Articles 4.2 (a) and (b) of the UNFCCC in terms of the quantitative economy-wide emission reduction targets that developed countries which are Parties to the Kyoto Protocol were supposed to achieve. However, the implementation of these common and differentiated obligations is designed to feed into strengthening the ability of Parties to implement the Convention and hence address climate change through the achievement of the objective of the Convention under its Article 2. Note that Article 4.7 of the Convention stresses that – *"the extent to which developing country Parties will effectively implement their commitments under the Convention will depend on the effective implementation by developed country Parties of their commitments under the Convention related to financial resources and transfer of technology and will take fully into account that economic and social development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities of the developing country Parties."* It is reiterated that under Article 4.4 of the Paris Agreement, a clear demarcation of roles has been provided for between developed and developing countries in relation to mitigation. With developed countries undertaking quantified economy-wide emission reduction commitments, and developing countries undertaking enhanced mitigation actions, in light of different national circumstances. Keeping in view the differentiated obligations under the Paris Agreement, the actions and efforts of the developed countries should demonstrate the leadership envisioned in the aforesaid provision.

3.2 Adaptation

(i) Adaptation is within the scope of the GST under Article 14. 1 of the Paris Agreement. For developing countries, adaptation goals often get prioritized in climate change actions. This is owed to the focus of climate change actions for many developing countries, given their particular vulnerabilities to the adverse impacts of climate change, their level of development, and their generally low emissions volume. However, adaptation has not found equal space nor given parity with mitigation in the climate regime.

(ii) A large section of the population is vulnerable to climate change impacts, and thus, adaptation is as relevant as mitigation. Most technologies for climate adaptation in sectors like agriculture, forestry, water and health are available on a very limited scale. The issue of technology, finance, and capacity-building needs to be addressed simultaneously and holistically following a comprehensive integrative approach.[17]

(iii) Transition to a low carbon economy while continuously weathering climate-induced events and disasters is cost intensive, requiring new, additional and climate-specific financial resources. As a double jeopardy, the COVID-19 pandemic has acted as an additional burden in the already climatically compromised developing countries. The impact of these disasters – whether it's the pandemic on the public health side or natural and climate-induced disasters – are burdening the fiscal space for developing countries, worsened by the lack of adequate climate finance for adaptation. The developing countries have to balance debt and sustainable development on one hand and disaster management and decarbonization on the other. The immediate way to tackle this is provision of climate finance. This is in line with existing calls for climate finance owed to the developing countries.

(iv) It is important to ensure that GST does not have a mitigation-centric outcome. There should be balance between mitigation and adaptation, in fact among all climate actions i.e. mitigation, adaptation, means of implementation and support (in terms of finance, technology transfer, and capacity building), and addressing the consequences of loss and damage and response measures and just and equitable transition of the workforce, in the context of impact of implementation of response measures.

(v) In terms of means of implementation and support provided for adaptation goals, developing countries end up making several trade-offs at the national level

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[17] The Synthesis Report of the Technical Dialogue of the First GST has observed that – *"collectively, there is increasing ambition in plans and commitments for adaptation action and support, but most observed adaptation efforts are fragmented, incremental, sector-specific and unequally distributed across regions."*

The Synthesis Report recommends, *"All stakeholders need to put in place long-term reforms that integrate climate change risks into all aspects of planning, decision-making and implementation. Implementation of adaptation action and support may take into consideration themes identified as possible elements in the framework for the GGA being developed under the Glasgow–Sharm el-Sheikh work programme on the GGA: water; food and agriculture; cities, settlements and key infrastructure; health; poverty and livelihoods; terrestrial and freshwater ecosystems, and oceans and coastal ecosystems; tangible cultural heritage; mountain regions; and biodiversity. adaptation efforts are failing to keep pace with increasing climate impacts and risks and plans on paper are not necessarily being implemented in practice. In addition, there is increased evidence of maladaptation across many sectors and regions as well as broader development decisions that are driving increases in climate-related risks."*

Source: Key finding 10; Technical dialogue of the first global stocktake Synthesis report by the co-facilitators on the technical dialogue; accessed at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/sb2023_09_adv.pdf

in terms of allocation of domestic resources to address the impacts of climate change as a whole. This becomes glaring while balancing and addressing national development priorities such as, fostering sustainable economic development, eradicating poverty, providing energy security, and securing the basic social needs.

(vi) GST should therefore find the extent to which the developed countries, in accordance with their historical responsibilities, and pursuant to their commitment under Article 4.4 of the Convention, have provided sustained financing to developing countries to assist them in meeting the costs of adapting to the adverse effects of climate change.

3.3 Loss and Damage

(i) Discourse on the loss and damage fund has gained momentum, notably after its historic establishment at COP-27, with details to be clarified at COP-28. The appropriation of more than their fair shares of the carbon budget by the developed countries, means that over-emitters are disproportionately responsible for damages caused by global warming. Disbursement and access of the Loss and Damage fund is one way to quantify the monetary value of atmospheric appropriation by overshoot emissions by the developed countries.

(ii) Averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage requires urgent action across climate and development policies to manage risks comprehensively and provide support to impacted communities.[18] The loss and damage fund is a compensation in line with and in addition to the existing call for climate finance. Establishing the eligibility criterion for availing the fund must acknowledge historical responsibility by over-emitting countries, and provide fair compensation to countries still within their fair shares. Since Loss and Damage considers climate change effects over time, it can accommodate changes in emissions trajectories over time for future eligibility.

(iii) The Technical Assessment of the First GST has now acknowledged that *"there is an urgent need for more knowledge, understanding, support, policy and action to comprehensively manage risks and avert, minimize, and address loss and damage. Doing so comprehensively also requires development policies and actions that reduce vulnerabilities (through poverty eradication, education, biodiversity protection, etc.) and decrease exposures to risks (access to land, shift, etc.). These efforts are also closely related to efforts on disaster recovery from slow-onset and extreme events and should take into account measures to respond to both economic and non-economic loss and damage."*[19]

(iv) The Synthesis Report of the Technical Dialogue for first GST also

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[18] **Source:** Key finding 12; Technical dialogue of the first global stocktake Synthesis report by the co-facilitators on the technical dialogue; accessed at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/sb2023_09_adv.pdf

[19] **Source:** Key finding 12; Technical dialogue of the first global stocktake Synthesis report by the co-facilitators on the technical dialogue; accessed at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/sb2023_09_adv.pdf

recommends that it is essential to develop a common understanding of the priority gaps in responding to loss and damage and of the areas where support is most effective. Financing gaps relate to aspects such as the speed, adequacy, delivery, access to and thematic coverage of funding. Other gaps may relate to the application of existing methodologies, poor data quality and availability, limited coordination and coherence across efforts, and limited capacity- and knowledge-building. Technology, innovation and technical assistance are increasingly important needs for building capacity for averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage, and international cooperation on technology development and transfer also remains important.[20]

3.4 Impact of Response Measures

(i) It is pertinent to note that energy is a recurrent and cross-cutting theme in the technology needs of developing country Parties. Therefore, there is the need for accelerating adoption, development and transfer of climate technologies for environmentally sound and cost-effective energy systems. This objective should reflect the equity, adequate energy supplies, and increasing energy consumption in developing countries, and should take into consideration the situations of countries that are highly dependent on fossil fuels for which countries have serious difficulties in switching to alternatives. **[Emphasis Supplied]**

(ii) Developing countries have a right to sustainably develop, expand their economies, and improve their populations' quality of life. This requires initial increases in GHG emissions. For these nations to seize the opportunity to technologically leap-frog and preferentially adopt renewable energy sources over fossil fuel-based infrastructure requires provision of means of implementation in terms of deployment and transfer of technology; enabled by provision of climate finance.

(iii) Parties are committed to combating climate change, however, it is important to keep in view, energy security, affordability and accessibility as critical inalienable priorities to ensure growth and development alongside energy transition of the economy.

(iv) India's vision of low carbon development is based on the need to ensure India's high energy needs for development, including poverty eradication, achieving Sustainable Development Goals and economic growth. Further, it is necessary that the plan for the country's energy security is based both on the expansion of non-fossil fuel sources for power generation and rational utilization of fossil fuel resources. Specific steps for such utilization include, inter alia, expanding renewables and strengthening the grid and focusing on demand-side management.

(v) The narrative of system transformation is not supported by India, since it is a tremendous challenge for developing countries. The term transformation is

[20] **Source:** Key finding 13; Technical dialogue of the first global stocktake Synthesis report by the co-facilitators on the technical dialogue; accessed at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/sb2023_09_adv.pdf

applicable for developed countries where highly carbonized economies are already functioning in the decades of unrestricted development. Developed countries must demonstrate leadership in rapid decarbonization (energy use, land use, sustainable consumption patterns, etc.). It is necessary for meeting the long term goal of the Paris Agreement.[21] The Synthesis Report of the Technical Dialogue of the First GST has rightly observed that *"systems transformations generate many opportunities, but rapid change can be disruptive.* ***A focus on inclusion and equity can increase ambition in climate action and support.*** *"* **[Emphasis Supplied]** The Synthesis Report further recommends that *"such disruptions can be minimized by taking a whole-of-society approach, which is also informed by local context."*[22]

3.5 Obligations of the Developed Country Parties to provide finance and other means of implementation and support

(i) All climate actions, in some fundamental respects, have to be made complementary to the pursuit of long-term prosperity, poverty eradication, and sustainable development. Any fair or meaningful assessment of ambition cannot therefore be conducted, without simultaneously assessing the ambition of support provided.

(ii) Climate finance is central for **enabling** developing countries to implement mitigation and adaptation actions. It is also about providing finances for the Just transition that these countries still need.

(iii) Means of implementation and support have been identified as the enablers for developing countries' ability to respond to climate change. The Deputy Secretary-General identified *concrete and achievable actions*[23], such as –

- A call for G7 members to double their public climate finance for the period from 2021 to 2025 through new pledges that also include a doubling of grants.
- Call on the G7 to meet its 0.7 percent official development assistance (ODA)

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[21] The Synthesis Report of the Technical Dialogue of the First GST has observed that – *"to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty, governments need to support systems transformations that mainstream climate resilience and low GHG emissions development. Credible, accountable and transparent actions by non-Party stakeholders are needed to strengthen efforts for systems transformation."*

Source: Key finding 2; Technical dialogue of the first global stocktake Synthesis report by the co-facilitators on the technical dialogue; accessed at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/sb2023_09_adv.pdf

[22] **Source:** Key finding 3; Technical dialogue of the first global stocktake Synthesis report by the co-facilitators on the technical dialogue; accessed at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/sb2023_09_adv.pdf

[23] Deputy Secretary-General's opening remarks at Climate and Development Ministerial Meeting; 31 March 2021; accessed at: https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/dsg/statement/2021-03-31/deputy-secretary-generals-opening-remarks-climate-and-development-ministerial-meeting-prepared-for-delivery

target, which is vital to achieving the 2030 Agenda and for which the G7 must lead the way.[24]

- Streamlined access to climate support, transparent and simplified, especially for the most vulnerable.
- Support to locally and regionally-led adaptation and resilience initiatives in vulnerable countries, cities and communities at the frontlines of climate disruption.

3.5.1 Reaffirmation of the obligation to provide climate finance

(i) The provision of climate finance from Developed to Developing Country Parties is founded on the provisions of Article 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 of the UNFCCC.

(ii) COP-21 reaffirmed the commitment to mobilize USD 100 billion per year by 2020 and emphasized that "*developed country Parties shall provide* financial *resources to assist developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation in continuation of their existing obligations under the Convention."* Decision 1/CP.21, adopting the Paris Agreement "*strongly urges developed country Parties to scale up their level of financial support, with a concrete roadmap to achieve the goal of jointly providing US$ 100 billion annually by 2020 for mitigation and adaptation while significantly increasing adaptation finance from current levels and to further provide appropriate technology and capacity-building support.*"

(iii) Developed countries have been requested to prepare their next round of updated biennial submissions on strategies and approaches for scaling up climate finance for the unfulfilled Pre-2020 goal of jointly mobilizing USD 100 billion per year by 2020, with a view to updating information available on a pathway towards the goal (to be fulfilled by 2025). On the target, there has been an ongoing disagreement over what is to be reported and counted towards USD 100 billion.

(iv) The overarching cover decisions adopted at COP-26 urge Developed Country Parties to fully deliver on the USD 100 billion goal urgently and through till 2025, and emphasizes the importance of transparency in the implementation of their pledges. It also urges Developed Countries to at least double adaptation finance to developing countries from 2019 levels by 2025. Further, it emphasizes the need to significantly increase financial support to developing countries. The decision welcomed initiation of structured deliberations on a new collective quantified goal on climate finance (NCQG) and looked forward to the ad-hoc work program

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[24] Globally, ODA remains an important source of public financing for developing countries, particularly those without sufficient access to other sources. Yet, the 0.7 per cent of gross national income (GNI) ODA target, including the 0.15 per cent to 0.20 per cent target for least developed countries, remains largely unfulfilled by donors. Since 2010, when it reached its peak, ODA from OECD DAC member countries has fallen for two consecutive years, by a total of 6 per cent in real terms, to USD125.6 billion in 2012.

Source: ***The 0.7% ODA/GNI target - a history***; accessed at: https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/the07odagnitarget-ahistory.htm

Source: ***Financing for sustainable development***; OECD; accessed at: https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/

established under the CMA3 from 2022 to 2024 towards this goal. In addition, the Standing Committee on Finance has been mandated to work towards arriving at definitions of Climate Finance.

(v) Para 3, COP-27 decision on Long-term climate finance expresses, *"serious concern that the goal of developed country Parties to mobilize jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020 in the context of meaningful mitigation action and transparency on implementation has not yet been met and urges developed country Parties to meet the goal."* The decision on long-term climate finance is in line with India's argument to provide more transparency and to exclude external aspects (such as Climate Finance Data Portal) which have not been discussed on the multilateral forum.

(vi) Developing countries have sought transparency of financial flows and accounting rules for measuring progress in provision of finance; and more funds for adaptation[25]. There is however no mechanism or guideline in place for a transparent and clear evaluation of progress on the USD 100 billion by 2020 pledge.[26] India feels the need to push for "no more reports" on mobilized finance but actual finance provided to be brought to light. [Emphasis Supplied]

(vii) In 2020 (the initial target year of the USD 100 billion goal under UNFCCC) total climate finance provided and mobilised by developed countries for developing countries amounted to USD 83.3 billion, which is stated to be an increase of 4% from 2019 (USD 79.6 billion in 2019). The collective level of developed country climate finance still remains USD 16.7 billion short of the goal.[27] However, it is important to note that loans continue to be the main instrument used to provide public climate finance. In 2020, public climate finance mainly was in form of loans (71% or USD 48.6 billion, including both concessional and non-concessional loans) and, to a lesser extent, grants (26% or USD 17.9 billion).[28]

(viii) In 2020, Oxfam calculated that once loan repayments, interest and other factors are taken into account, net assistance was only in the region of USD 19-

[25] **Source**: ***National Statement by India at CoP26***, - "While we all are raising our ambitions on climate action, the world ambitions on climate finance cannot remain the same as they were at the time of the Paris Agreement." "Today it is necessary that as we track the progress made in climate mitigation, we should also track climate finance. The proper justice would be that the countries which do not live up to their promises made on climate finance, must be pressured too."

[26] **Source:** UNFCCC (2021), ***In-session workshop on long-term climate finance in 2020 Summary report by the secretariat***, FCCC/CP/2021/6, 24 August 2021, accessed at https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cp2021_06E.pdf

[27] **Source:** OECD (2022), ***Aggregate Trends of Climate Finance Provided and Mobilised by Developed Countries in 2013-2020***, Climate Finance and the USD 100 Billion Goal, OECD Publishing, Paris, accessed at https://doi.org/10.1787/d28f963c-en.

[28] Refer FN 27

22.5 billion per year in 2017-2018.[29]

(ix) In the aforesaid UNFCCC Summary Report, it was stated that there is an imbalance between finance for mitigation and adaptation with an estimated 25% of reported public climate finance was allocated to adaptation compared with 66% for mitigation in the period 2017 to 2018.[30]

(x) Inconsistencies shown between the OECD and Oxfam Reports above clearly point to the fact that no mechanism or guideline is in place for a transparent and clear evaluation of progress on the USD 100 billion goal. There is a need to assess achievement of the goal using comprehensive data such as – how much has been provided in loans and how much in grants, and how much is going to mitigation and how much to adaptation.

(xi) The Standing Committee on Finance (SCF), assists the COP on climate finance matters in exercising its functions with respect to the financial mechanisms of the Convention. The work involves improving coherence and coordination in the delivery of climate change financing, rationalization of the Financial Mechanism, mobilization of financial resources and measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) of support provided to developing country Parties. The SCF also serves the Paris Agreement. **SCF should be able to provide its own estimates where required to provide estimates of finance flows. It should be able to carry out its own exercise and estimates instead of just relying on secondary information. Where secondary information is being relied on, the rationale and assessment of the methodology followed also need to be discussed. SCF work should provide a critique of the different methodologies in light of the principles of the convention and its agreement. Such value addition can improve the utility of the reports of the SCF. [Emphasis Supplied]**

(xii) The developing countries have vocalized that new and additional sources of funding as envisaged under Articles 9.3 and 9.5 of the Paris Agreement should be included over and above what has already been pledged / committed by the developed countries. There is a huge gap in the expectations of the developing countries and delivery of the promised Pre 2020 finance and other means of implementation by the developed countries. There is a **need for new and additional finances, over and above** the promised amount of financial assistance being mobilized, including clarity about what counts as 'new and additional' climate finance.

(xiii) In Decision 19/CMA.1, at the persistence of the developed country Parties, finance flows was made equivalent and at par with means of implementation and support on the following lines – ***"The finance flows, including the information referred to in Article 2, paragraph 1(c), and means of implementation and support and mobilization and provision of support, including the information referred to in Article 9, paragraphs 4 and 6, Article 10,***

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[29] **Source:** Oxfam (2020), ***Climate Finance Shadow Report 2020: Assessing progress towards the $100 billion commitment**,* Oxford: Oxfam International Publishing, accessed at: https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/climate-finance-shadow-report-2020.

[30] Refer FN 27

paragraph 6, Article 11, paragraph 3, and Article 13, in particular paragraphs 9 and 10, of the Paris Agreement. This should include information from the latest biennial assessment and overview of climate finance flows of the Standing Committee on Finance;"[31]

(xiv) The interpretation of Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement by the Developed countries is violative of Equity. For means of implementation and support, provision of finance should *inter alia* either be generic or public funding, as provided under Article 9.5 under the Paris Agreement.

(xv) Article 2.1 (c) reads – *"Making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development"* is being touted as – *'aligning finance flows, is the highest finance goal under the Paris Agreement.'* This is unacceptable, as it seriously undermines the obligation and efforts to mobilize climate finance by developed countries to developing countries. This basically translates **all** global capital available to be diverted towards low-GHG emissions and climate-resilient development. It also translates to hereinafter no fossil fuel subsidies, no investments in non-Paris Agreement aligned pathways, net zero economies, increased focus on mobilization of private sector finance and MDBs, etc. India asserts that the global climate finance flows need to catch up with the resource requirements.

(xvi) 'Paris Agreement aligned finance flows' as being read under Article 2.1 (c) is **not the same as the commitment and obligation of developed countries to provide climate finance** under the Convention and under Article 9 of its Paris Agreement. The singling out of "messages on finance flows" do not address concerns of public finance and provision of support by developed countries to developing countries to achieve the pathway towards low GHG emissions and climate-resilient development.

(xvii) Article 2.1(c) is being used by developed countries to restrict ODA for essential fossil fuel development and force high rate of mitigation on developing countries. Such proposals do not consider means of implementation and support, and do not consider national circumstances but refer to alignment of different climate policies without any mention of developed countries taking the lead in their emissions obligations. The obligations and key aspects do not align with the principles of the Paris Agreement, as it makes provision of means of implementation and support voluntary. Creating an enabling environment is paramount to ensure effective means of implementation and support, including provision of climate finance, capacity-building and fostering technology transfer. It is reiterated that the goals of the Paris Agreement, including Article 2.1(c) must be read in light of Article 2.2 of the Paris Agreement. Any assessment of progress has to be made, based in Equity and CBDR-RC, therefore, providing means of implementation and support in terms of finance, technology transfer and capacity building, should include the full Article 2, and not just Article 2.1 of the Paris Agreement.

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[31] Para 36(d); Decision 19/CMA.1

(xviii) Implementation of Article 2.1(c) is being used in denying essential fossil fuel development for developing countries, even though these have serious consequences for their economies and their population. On the other hand, developed countries are continuing their profligate investment in fossil fuel infrastructure and production. At the same time, all the other provisions of the Paris Agreement on climate finance are being ignored, with increasing focus on Article 2.1(c). The use of Article 2.1(c) by Developed countries to restrict ODA for essential fossil fuel development and force high rate of mitigation on developing countries needs to be discussed in detail.

(xix) Decision 12/CMA.1 recognized the importance of predictability and clarity of information on financial support by developed to developing country Parties. While the communications under Article 9.5 are not explicitly listed as a source of input to the GST, the Secretariat has been mandated to publish a compilation and synthesis of the communications which is to *"inform the global stocktake"* (under Decision 12/CMA.1, Para 7). GST is to consider finance flows as a source of inputs. However, assessment of the implementation of Article 2.1(c) cannot be done appropriately without an understanding on what can be classified as climate finance. **Furthermore, discussions on public funding as provided under Article 9.5; new and additional sources of funding envisaged under Articles 9.3 and 9.5; biennial reporting mandated under Article 9.5; assessment on finance flows post-2020 before 2023 GST, all must find consideration under the GST. [Emphasis Supplied]**

3.5.2 Other Finance matters and emphasis on needs and priorities of developing countries

(i) Review of USD 100 billion goal: Synthesis report of the USD 100 billion per year by 2020 goal, the outcome of which would contribute to the process in setting up a New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG), prior to 2025. There is an acknowledgement to strengthen and urgently scale up climate action and setting the NCQG in 2024 taking into account needs and priorities of developing countries.

(ii) Long-term climate finance (LTF): Continuation of LTF beyond 2025.

(iii) New Collective Quantified Goal: Initiation of the process to set a new collective goal prior to completion of the USD 100 billion goal by 2025, which also serves as the base/floor to which the additional fund needs to be provided under the goal.

(iv) Matters related to the Standing Committee on Finance (SCF) on matters such as – definition of climate finance; avoiding double counting; the developed countries' insistence on bringing in private finance in furtherance to Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement, etc. India strongly argues in favour of definition of climate finance, to bring clarity and trust in the process and among Parties.

(v) It has been highlighted that the needs of developing countries are in trillions, and concessional finance is crucial to avoid debt distress among developing countries. A vital point of reference is the first ever *Needs Determination Report of* *the developing countries* related to the implementation of the Convention and its Paris Agreement by the SCF, published in October 2021. Based on information in countries' NDCs; National Communications; and Biennial Update Reports; and other national reports, the SCF mentions that requirements are in the range of USD 5.8 trillion to USD 12 trillion. The need for climate finance is immense, even when the estimates do not capture all the identified needs. Therefore, it is essential to underline that an ambitious new collective quantifiable goal is imperative in achieving the NDCs.

(vi) There are several estimates of resources required to meet the net zero targets set down by countries. It is estimated that USD 4 trillion per year needs to be invested in renewable energy up until 2030 to be able to reach the goal of net zero emissions by 2050, and investment of at least USD 4–6 trillion per year will be required for a global transformation to a low-carbon economy.[32] The OECD estimates that USD 6.9 trillion a year is required up to 2030 to meet global climate and development objectives.[33] Further, it is estimated that adaptation could require yearly investments of USD 160-340 billion by 2030 and USD 315-565 billion by 2050.[34]

3.5.3 Assessment of the provision of climate finance

(i) Any assessment of climate finance must bring out the challenges such as –

- How much funds are coming from loans and how much from grants?
- How much finance is being routed to existing projects in the Developing countries?
- How much co-financing exists between developed and developing countries?
- How much finance from Developed to Developing countries is coming from public sources?
- How much public finance resources are going to mitigation and how much to adaptation?
- How can Annex – 1 Parties scale up public adaptation finance through direct investment and by overcoming barriers to private sector involvement?

[32] **Source:** Special Report on ***Net Zero by 2050 A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector***; International Energy Agency (IEA) (2021); accessed at: https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/deebef5d-0c34-4539-9d0c-10b13d840027/NetZeroby2050-ARoadmapfortheGlobalEnergySector_CORR.pdf

[33] **Source:** ***Financing Climate Futures Rethinking Infrastructure***; OECD/The World Bank/UN Environment (2018), Financing Climate Futures: Rethinking Infrastructure, OECD Publishing, Paris; accessed at: https://www.oecd.org/environment/cc/climate-futures/policy-highlights-financing-climate-futures.pdf

[34] **Source:** United Nations Environment Programme (2022). ***Adaptation Gap Report 2022: Too Little, Too Slow – Climate adaptation failure puts world at risk***; Nairobi; accessed at: https://www.unep.org/adaptation-gap-report-2022

(ii) Assessment of the commitment to mobilize USU 100 billion per year by the developed country Parties is a roadmap to raise climate change finance from the floor of USD 100 billion to match the three essential – S's of climate finance- Scope, Scale and Speed is an urgent and a fair ask by developing countries to deliver climate justice.

(iii) Counting only public grants, and concessional values of loans only as climate finance – There is a significant gap between developed and developing countries in their capacity to raise public revenues. Substantial State resources are often tied up in debt repayments, despite debt relief initiatives. Loans may have a role, but only if they are measured in their concessional terms. Only when a loan offers an interest rate below the market rate, the grant equivalent can be calculated as equal to the difference between net present discounted values of the interest rate charged and the market rate. The Deputy Secretary-General observed in 2021 –

> ***"We cannot deliver a decade of transformation when so many developing countries face crushing levels of debt. So we welcome recent calls for a massive injection of liquidity and extensive debt relief based on real vulnerability that provides vulnerable countries, including Middle Income Countries, the resources and fiscal space they need. Equally important will be transforming the international debt architecture so that it ensures all can emerge from this crisis with an equal chance of building back better and differently."***

(iv) Counting only such transfers of ex-post finance that are formalized in an entry in a book of accounts as specifically climate finance, and preferably earmarked as either mitigation or adaptation or cross cutting, by both the recipient and the source countries.

(v) Counting actual disbursements of finance crossing borders in a particular year, and not as multi-year promises, pledges, and/or other indefinite commitments.

(vi) Examining and answering how to treat private climate finance that are 'mobilized' or 'leveraged' in terms of the public backing granted by source countries to qualify as grant or grant-equivalent.

3.5.4 New and Additional Finances

(i) There is a **need for new and additional finances, over and above** the promised amount of financial assistance being mobilized, including clarity about what counts as 'new and additional' climate finance. Defining climate finance i.e. clearly defining what is meant by the terms – 'new and additional' to other forms of ODA and not just diverted from existing levels of ODA towards climate finance; defining starting value or baseline value of climate finance; etc.

(ii) India states that its climate actions have so far been largely financed from domestic resources. However, providing new and additional financial resources as well as transfer of technology to address the global climate change challenge are among the commitments and responsibilities of the developed countries under UNFCCC and its Paris Agreement. India will also require its due share from such international financial resources and technological support. Financing comes from domestic sources (including both public and private finance) should be seen as complementary and not substitutes to provision of climate finance and other means of implementation and support.

3.5.5 Finance for Adaptation

(i) Developing countries need access to resources to achieve social and economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner, while allowing adapting to the impacts of climate change.

(ii) Global estimates show a considerable gap in adaptation finance, which is estimated to significantly increase in the future. The Adaptation Gap Report 2022 found that international adaptation finance flows to developing countries are 5-10 times below estimated needs and the gap is widening. Estimated annual adaptation needs are USD 160-340 billion by 2030 and USD 315-565 billion by 2050. GST should share insight on how to bridge this gap and accelerate funding / resource allocation towards adaptation.

(iii) The UNFCCC Summary Report on long term finance in 2020 states that there is an imbalance between finance for mitigation and adaptation with an estimated 25% of reported public climate finance was allocated to adaptation compared with 66% for mitigation in the period 2017 to 2018.

(iv) At COP-26, new pledges to the Adaptation Fund were made, and UNFCCC acknowledged them as "concrete action" to help vulnerable nations. These pledges included USD 50 million from USA, USD 8.1 million from Canada, USD 116.4 million from the European Commission, USD 20.6 million from the UK, etc., totalling to USD 356 million.[35] **As of 2022, just before COP-27 pledges made by the aforesaid nations remained undelivered with an outstanding of around USD 230 million i.e. 65% yet to be delivered. While yet another opportunity has been given to meet the pledges before COP-28, the developing countries wait and watch.**

(v) United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), in its Report[36] stated that the consequences of continued neglect [towards the adaptation challenges] have become more apparent in the aftermath of the health pandemic, which has focused attention of nations on strengthening resilience.

(vi) As a further climate adaptation challenge, the world witnessed a series of extreme weather events in 2021, which hit both the developed and developing

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[35] **Source:** Carbon Copy (2022) ***Most COP26 Adaptation Finance Pledges Remain Undelivered Ahead of COP27***; Rishika Pardikar; September 28, 2022; accessed at https://carboncopy.info/most-cop26-adaptation-finance-pledges-remain-undelivered-ahead-of-cop27/

[36] **Source:** UNCTAD (2021) ***Trade and Development Report From Recovery To Resilience: The Development Dimension***, UNCTAD/TDR/2021, accessed at https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/tdr2021_part2_en.pdf

countries with unprecedented losses. These occurrences continued in 2022. The AR6 indicates further loss of lives, livelihoods and infrastructure in the near future. Consequently, properly financed adaptation strategies are vital for survival of vulnerable nations and protection of human habitats across the planet and at all levels of development.

(vii) For developing countries, it is now a double jeopardy of dealing with the aftermath of the pandemic as well as continuing to deal with and respond to the climate crises. Developing countries are taking significant climate actions despite limited resources and capacity constraints. Therefore, developed countries must take lead in supporting developing countries in combating and adapting to impacts of climate change, in furtherance to their historical responsibility and the mandate of the Framework Convention and its Paris Agreement.

3.6 Technology Transfer and Development

(i) Technology's potential to address growing resource scarcity and worsening environmental degradation and climate change has unrealized potential. Article 15 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recognizes **the right of all people** "to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications."

(ii) Commitments under the UNFCCC envisage facilitation of technology transfer from the developed countries to developing countries. However, progress in technology transfer has fallen short of the ambitious goals laid out in the UNFCCC and its Paris Agreement and technological progress has often failed to produce envisaged development results. This can be attributed to the absence of a favourable enabling environment. The UNFCCC, in Article 4.1(c), calls on all Parties to "promote and cooperate in the development, application and diffusion, including transfer, of technologies, practices and processes that control, reduce or prevent anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases" and places **responsibility on developed country Parties** to *"take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to environmentally sound technologies and know-how to other Parties, particularly developing country Parties, to enable them to implement the provisions of the Convention"* (Article 4.5, UNFCCC).

(iii) While technology is a key means of implementation and support for Paris Agreement commitments, the issue of technology development and the transfer of environmentally sound technologies (ESTs) for climate mitigation is heavily contested between developed and developing countries; and these differences continue to persist as the Paris Agreement is implemented. Article 10.1 of the Paris Agreement articulates a shared 'long-term vision on the importance of fully realizing technology development and transfer in order to improve resilience to climate change and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.' Further, all Parties are required 'to strengthen cooperative action on technology development and transfer' (Article 10.2 of the Paris Agreement). In addition, support, including financial support, 'shall be provided' to developing country Parties for the implementation of

Article 10, 'including for strengthening cooperative action on technology development and transfer at different stages of the technology cycle, with a view to achieving a balance between support for mitigation and adaptation' (Article 10.6 of the Paris Agreement).

(iv) Progress in negotiations on technology transfer and development always faced obstacles due to the "relationship between intellectual property rights (IPRs) and technology transfer." Policymakers and Parties have been unable to find the right balance between access to technology and recompense for innovation, and it remains a fundamental challenge. However, India has observed in its Third Biennial Update Report (Third BUR)[37] that despite arguing for the sanctity of the IPR regime, technology development in all the Annex-I countries has registered a significant slow-down across all sectors of the UNFCCC recognized categories of "climate change mitigation technologies." Following a peak in 2009 to 2011, patenting activity in these technologies has fallen over a range from 30 to 80 per cent, indicating that in the absence of legally binding commitments, Annex-I parties have significantly slowed down their technology development.

(v) Parties need to recognise the importance of ESTs, and their development and transfer in a barrier-free environment to achieve the objectives of the Convention, and to uphold its Paris Agreement. To leverage technology to make the low carbon development pathways available to developing countries, the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) must bring a technology roadmap work into a technology needs mapping across developing countries, taking into account, *inter alia*, existing Technology Needs Assessments (TNAs), research initiatives of Parties, and involvement of the private sector.

(vi) TNAs are a long-standing process under the UNFCCC. Since 2001, more than 80 developing countries have undertaken TNAs to assess their technology needs to address climate change.[38] The second round of TNAs commenced in 2009 and continues until present. This round has placed a greater emphasis on implementation, on supporting developing countries to translate their identified technology needs into implemented projects and programmes. Developing countries since 2001 have identified their technology needs through the TNAs and have proposed more than 1000 technology action plans (TAPs), yet most of these remain unfunded, resulting in implementation gaps in terms of fulfilling the technology transfer provisions of the UNFCCC and its Paris Agreement.[39] Without the needed finance and technology transfer, developing countries are left to undertake climate actions on their own resources which are often constrained by other challenges.

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[37] MoEFCC. (2021); ***India: Third Biennial Update Report to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change***; Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, Government of India; accessed at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/INDIA_%20BUR-3_20.02.2021_High.pdf

[38] The concept of the TNA was formalized under the UNFCCC process at COP-7 in 2001 with the establishment of the Technology Transfer Framework - Decision 4/CP.7

[39] **Source:** Technology Needs Assessment Pathways for climate tech implementation; https://unfccc.int/ttclear/tna

(vii) According to the UNFCCC Climate Change Secretariat's ***Synthesis Report on the information identified in decision 19/CMA.1, paragraph 36 (d)***,[40] (SYR-36(d))) information provided by Parties on climate technology related matters was mainly on specific technologies to be deployed; technology needs; policy, regulatory and legal aspects; technology innovation, research and development; and support required by Parties or support provided by Parties for technology development and transfer.

(viii) The SYR-36(d)) also states that the technology needs mentioned by developing country Parties were mainly in the areas of energy, agriculture, water, waste, transport, climate observation and early warning. In terms of specific technologies that developing country Parties intend to use for achieving their adaptation and mitigation targets were cross-sectoral energy-efficient appliances and processes; enhanced use of renewable energy technologies such as hydropower, solar, wind and biomass; low- or zero-emission vehicles; blended fuel; waste to energy technologies; and climate-smart agriculture.

(ix) These observations are in sync with some of India's identified major technology needs, which are in the areas of – solar photovoltaic, offshore wind, advanced ultra-supercritical coal technology, biofuels, and cost-effective energy storage in order to pursue import substitution, cut high costs and dependence on international supply chains and to pursue early development and deployment of future technologies and practices.

3.7 Capacity Building

(i) Capacity Building is a cross-cutting issue inextricably linked to recognizing the special needs of least developed countries and other developing countries. There is a need for capacity-building for policy coherence and integrated approaches to sustainable development, which is lacking in all countries. Consistent with the principle of equitable access to sustainable development, an institutional arrangement is required to ensure that all developing countries receive capacity building and capability enhancement support for designing and operationalization of their long-term low carbon development plans.

3.8 Gap Assessment – Actual Progress and Gaps in Implementation

(i) The outcome of GST must result in bridging the significant gaps in economic and social development and poverty eradication between developed and developing country Parties and how Parties collectively move forward in addressing global climate change actions and gaps must be considered through the same comprehensive, facilitative and inclusive lens. To this extent, India sees gap

[40] **Synthesis report for the technical assessment component of the first global stocktake : Synthesis report on the information identified in decision 19/CMA.1, paragraph 36 (d)**; Prepared by the Secretariat under the guidance of the co-facilitators of the technical dialogue of the first global stocktake; 20 April 2022; accessed at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/GST_SR_23d_MOI.pdf

assessment as an assessment of progress of actual implementation.

(ii) The analysis of progress should go beyond identifying the gaps in emissions, rather options may be provided for bridging this gap. In this context, the GST outcome should provide information on the policy-options related to low-emissions i.e. different emission-reduction options and corresponding policy measures; inter-linkages with SDGs; information on the effectiveness and efficiency of adaptation, mitigation and finance measures adopted; identify best practices and technology needs; and provide options for scaling-up ambition.

(iii) Information on gaps in scientific information and projections as part of the collective assessment of progress, considering the AR6 emphasise on regional perspectives, informed by national information.

3.8.1 Pre-2020 Gaps –

(i) GST should aim to enable Parties to clearly assess where we actually stand, what progress we have achieved on the ground, and what are the implementation gaps and challenges for Parties, including with respect to how to address historical responsibility and the Pre-2020 implementation and ambition under the Convention and its related instruments, and to look forward in terms of what must be done to close the gaps to achieve our collective goals and how these actions could be delivered in a systemic and transformative way.

(ii) The IPCC (for the first time in its Fourth Assessment Report and then again in the 1.5 degrees Special Report) indicated *"significant gaps in pre-2020 action even amounting to up to 40-50% and called for emissions reductions by about 25-40% by developed countries in this period."* It was the IPCC that had indicated that developed countries must cut their GHGs emissions by at least 25-40% below 1990 levels by 2020; and to revisit their 2020 targets no later than 2014.

(iii) Between 2008-2012, Annex I countries reduced emissions by only 5%. Thereafter, even after taking on the commitment to cut their GHGs emissions at least by 18% relative to 1990 levels between 2013 and 2020, the actual achievement is only 13% as per assessment reported by the Secretariat.[41] It has been stated in as many words that the developed world's commitments were significantly insufficient to respond to the call of science. To better understand the progress made National Inventory Reports of developed countries submitted by

[41] **Source:** ***Paving the Way For the Success of the Paris Agreement : Climate action and support before 2020***; accessed at: https://newsroom.unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/UNFCCC_C_an_-S_Brochure-web.pdf

Source: UNFCCC Secretariat, Assessing the overall aggregated effects of steps taken by Parties on mitigation (November 2020), Slide 3 presented at the Pre 2020 Rountable at the November Climate Dialogues, 2020, accessed at https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/2.1%202020_CD_GST_InputsOnMitigation_26%20Nov%20ver.pdf

April 15, 2022[42] as well as the National Inventory Submissions 2023 by April 15, 2023[43], must serve as a necessary consideration for the First GST. A cursory glance through the Secretariat's Report is adequate to state that the non-EIT Annex I Parties have not managed to reduce their aggregate emissions between 1990 and 2020. Instead, these non-EIT Parties' aggregate emissions increased from 13,227.97 MTCO2eq in 1990 to 13,331.23 MTCO2eq in 2020.[44]

3.8.2 Adaptation Gaps –

(i) AR6-WG-II report stressed that huge adaptation gaps between current levels of adaptation and levels needed to respond to impacts and to reduce climate risks are evident. However, lack of a comprehensive recognition and elaboration of adaptation gaps; assessment of progress in adaptation actions; defining the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) quantitatively and qualitatively; present challenges to accelerate adaptation actions. It is vital to take stock of gaps and progress on adaptation and precipitate the establishment of the GGA.

(ii) It will be good to set the tone for the GGA through the GST outcome, mandating the IPCC to provide the information on progress towards the goal, via information on adaptation measures and how to assess the collective progress towards the GGA. Information may also be provided on methodologies related to adaptation needs in developing countries, based on Equity and its indicators, considering the GGA is more context-specific, as compared to other global goals under the Paris Agreement such as the temperature goal.

3.8.3 Finance and Support Gaps –

(i) At COP-26, developed country Parties were urged to fully deliver on the USD 100 billion goal urgently and through till 2025, and emphasizes the importance of transparency in the implementation of their pledges. The developed countries were also urged to at least double adaptation finance to developing countries from 2019 levels by 2025. It was emphasized that developed countries need to significantly increase financial support to developing countries. The decision welcomed initiation

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[42] National Inventory Submissions 2022; accessed at: https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/transparency-and-reporting/reporting-and-review-under-the-convention/national-inventory-submissions-2022

[43] National Inventory Submissions 2023; accessed at: https://unfccc.int/ghg-inventories-annex-i-parties/2023

[44] **Source:** ***Paving the Way For the Success of the Paris Agreement : Climate action and support before 2020;*** accessed at: https://newsroom.unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/UNFCCC_C_an_-S_Brochure-web.pdf

Source: UNFCCC Secretariat, Assessing the overall aggregated effects of steps taken by Parties on mitigation (November 2020), Slide 4 presented at the Pre 2020 Rountable at the November Climate Dialogues, 2020, accessed at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/2.1%202020_CD_GST_InputsOnMitigation_26%20Nov%20ver.pdf of structured deliberations on a new collective quantified goal (NCQG) on climate finance and looked forward to the ad-hoc work program established under the CMA-3 from 2022 to 2024 towards this goal. In addition, the Standing Committee on Finance has been mandated to work towards arriving at definitions of Climate Finance. These decisions were reaffirmed at COP-27. At COP-28, not only must the GST outcome highlight the non-fulfillment of the Pre-2020 climate finance commitment goal, it must accentuate gaps between funding scale and needs of developing countries in terms of public funding, and new and additional funding. In terms of gaps in support provided by developed countries in terms of finance, technology deployment and transfer, and capacity building to developing countries, the GST outcome must identify roadblocks to providing such support.

(ii) India has always maintained that the aim of GST is to assess, apart from the collective progress of the Country Parties' climate change actions, the gaps in implementation and support (as envisaged under the Paris Agreement for various climate actions), and to ensure that they are met, in the following contexts –

- Keeping in view the differentiated responsibilities identified within the provisions of the Paris Agreement, an assessment must be made under the GST process of the gaps in the efforts of the Developed Country Parties in controlling and mitigating their emissions.
- Analysing and sharing information related to and assessment of gaps in providing finance, technology development and transfer, and capacity building and identification and provision of information on options to scale up climate finance and technology development and transfer from developed to developing country Parties.
- Details of support regarding technology development and transfer by the Developed Country Parties, must be provided, to assess how much technology transfer has already been made and what gaps remains. The same process must be followed for capacity building support as well.
- Towards achieving the global finance goal (envisaged under Article 9.3 of the Paris Agreement), GST should assess the aggregate impact of the level of financial support provided to the Developing Country Parties, and if there are any gaps in such support provided.
- For parity between Adaptation and Mitigation, GST should not be confined to the assessment of gaps in the means of implementation and support provided for mitigation alone, it should include a review of the gaps in the support provided for adaptation as well.
- The Outcome should illustrate the gaps in means of implementation due to shortfall of the support in finance, technology development and transfer, and capacity building, and identify the roadblocks in providing such support by the developed countries.

3.9 Operationalization of CBDR-RC; Equity; and Climate Justice

(i) Equity is the cornerstone of the climate change discourse, and for the implementation of the Paris Agreement, operationalization of Equity is most important, as the core of the GST process, and each component of GST will be based in Equity.

(ii) Equity has its origins in the UNFCCC is a part of its Paris Agreement. Therefore, addressing the issue of Equity is crucial to an agreement as ambitious as the Paris Agreement, which brings developed and developing countries together towards a common goal pertaining to climate change. However, in recent years, the steady dilution of differentiation and equity, reflects that the principles of the Framework Convention are currently not even being considered by the Parties, in the climate change discourse. **[Emphasis Supplied]**

(iii) CBDR-RC is a core principle in the Convention and its Paris Agreement. The Paris Agreement adopts a differentiation-based approach to the structure of its obligations, building on that of the UNFCCC but with some significant differences. There is a set of common obligations applicable to all Parties – e.g. Articles 2.2, 3, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.8, 4.9, 4.13, 4.15, 13.7, while there is also a set of differentiated obligations applicable only to developed country Parties – i.e. Articles 4.5, 9.1, 9.5, 9.7, 10.6, 13.9, 13.14., and 13.15. Additionally, under Article 4.4, the Paris Agreement clearly differentiates between developed and developing country Parties with respect to their emission reduction actions, as "developed country Parties should continue taking the lead in undertaking economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets" while "developing country Parties should continue enhancing their mitigation efforts" and simply being "encouraged to move over time towards economy- wide emission reduction or limitation targets in the light of different national circumstances." As with the Convention, these sets of common and differentiated obligations under its Paris Agreement are based on Equity and the principle of CBDR-RC. Therefore, what is common and what is differentiated is already clear to and understood by the Country Parties. The differentiation comes into focus on – means of implementation and support in terms of finance, technology transfer and development, and support provided to the developing countries by the developed countries.

(iv) A comprehensive and inclusive GST outcome needs be shaped that takes into account the needs and special circumstances of developing countries, and how climate change impacts, actions, and responses, have a bearing on sustainable development and eradication of poverty.

(v) The meaning of Equity, or how it needs to be understood under the Paris Agreement, has been given various interpretations. Equity as anchored under the UNFCCC and its Paris Agreement means the right to development of and eradication of poverty from developing countries. This needs to be reflected in the decision text of the GST outcome.

(vi) The outcome of GST needs to capture the essence of Equity and CBDR-RC, in letter and spirit, as defined and envisioned under the Convention and the Preamble of the Paris Agreement. Under the UNFCCC, it is recognised that –

> ***"Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the <u>basis of</u>***

***equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof."*– Article 3.1, UNFCCC**

In furtherance to the above, India reiterates that –

- Equity finds mention as early as the text of the Convention, wherein under Article 3, Equity has been identified as the guiding principle to attain the objectives of the Convention.
- Equity, as provisioned under Article 2.2 of the Paris Agreement, is an important aspect of the GST. A plain reading of Article 14.1 of the Paris Agreement may be made, wherein it clearly stipulates that the GST process has to be based in Equity along with best available science. Therefore, Equity has to go hand in hand, and the provision cannot be read selectively or in isolation.
- In furtherance to the goals and vision of the Paris Agreement, it is important that care is taken in assimilating Equity within GST. It needs to be understood, that an aggregate assessment of progress has to be made, based in Equity, of all climate actions i.e. mitigation, adaptation, means of implementation and support (in terms of finance, technology transfer and development, and capacity building), to ensure differentiation in the GST process between developed and developing countries.
- Equity must be reflected in the efforts and actions of the Developed Country parties.

(vii) The operationalization of Equity and CBDR-RC therefore needs to be understood in the following light,[45] especially with respect to GST –

- First, Equity must be the basis for all climate change actions, i.e. mitigation, adaptation, and means of implementation and support in terms of finance, technology development and transfer and capacity building.
- Second, such efforts at protecting the climate and combating issues pertaining to and arising from climate change must be in accordance with common but differentiated responsibilities.
- Third, the efforts of individual Parties will depend on their national and respective capabilities.

(viii) A concrete operationalization of Equity should be captured in the GST Outcome. Equity is to be understood in the context of –

- **equitable outcome for nations** – all countries are entitled to equitable access to development. However, nations which have enjoyed benefits of development have limited the available carbon space for those nations that

[45] BASIC experts, 2011. ***Equitable access to sustainable development: Contribution to the body of scientific knowledge.*** BASIC expert group: Beijing, Brasilia, Cape Town and Mumbai

were not on a high development trajectory. Equity is essential to help the latter attain their developmental goals. For instance, India being a developing country and second most populous country will have increasing GHG emissions trend. Operationalization of equity may be in terms of calculation of per capita GHG emissions taking into account the effect of policies to reduce emissions like increase in use of renewable energy, electric vehicles (EVs), creation of carbon sink etc. to project the values for future years.

- **equity among individuals** – i.e. outcome to affect all individuals aspiring for their highest well-being.[46] Average life satisfaction is higher in countries with greater GDP per capita, average income and per capita GDP are measures of economic development, and vulnerability to climate change negatively impacts GDP per capita.
- **Inter-Generational Equity** – sufficient natural environment needs to be provided for future generations to survive; and it is required that we come up with sustainable consumption patterns. This is a fundamental requirement and is the foundation of sustainable development. However, India emphasizes that efforts at poverty eradication, the ramping up of the provision of basic services and assuring well-being of all are also an integral part of intergenerational equity.

(ix) There are various options available to operationalize Equity in the GST process. Fair outcome is as important as a fair process, and a set of indicators that address concerns of all countries may be considered, and there are several to choose from based on national circumstances – per capita emissions, historical emissions, ability to pay (countries which have enjoyed development are capable of paying and diverting funds towards low carbon emission pathways), etc.

(x) Equity is the benchmark to measure fairness and ambition. Therefore, India has identified indicators of Equity which should be considered to attribute capability and responsibility to the parties. –

- **Historical Responsibility** – This notion is central to the Equity debate and a measure of responsibility. Countries' share of historical global emissions remains one of the essential parameters in so-called Equity proposals, which attempt to distribute effort among countries in an equitable manner.[47]

[46] India supports *GHG emission per capita* and *GHG Emission intensity trend* as measures and criteria for operationalizing equity and to calculate the total responsibility of each nation.

[47] ***Historical Responsibility for Climate Change – from countries emissions to contribution to temperature increase***; Report commissioned by the Brazilian Environmental Ministry; November 2015; Climate Analytics and Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research. This proposal however, considers past cumulative emissions in totality and not per capita emissions of each country in allocating mitigation burden. The methodology used in the proposal to calculate the total responsibility of each nation (using a complex set of calculations) is also now outdated in the light of the latest scientific literature on the subject. Reference maybe had to ***Equity and Differentiation in the Context of the 2015 Climate Agreement***; Report for the Ministry of Environment Forests and Climate Change; November 2015; Centre for Climate Change and Sustainability Studies Tata Institute of Social Sciences (TISS), Mumbai

- **Human Development Index (HDI)**[48] – HDI may be considered a tool for guiding the outcome of GST and to operationalize Equity within it. HDI is a clear measure of development, the potential to mitigate, and the technical and financial capabilities to respond to climate change. This will, *inter alia*, answer questions such as – How countries fare in terms of HDI, how their development trajectory and carbon requirement should meet HDI goals, and examination of carbon space with developing countries in terms of development of HDI.
- **Carbon space** allotted to parties to meet their development needs, including equitable sharing of the global historical carbon budget, and per capita cumulative historical emissions. Equity can only be achieved if the loss of equitably allowed carbon space for the developing nations is made up by providing access to technology and finance that can compensate for this loss of carbon space. Countries which have enjoyed carbon budget from before are not reducing emissions at the same scale which allows a just distribution of the carbon budget. The outcome should record that Equity in GST will provide development space and carbon space to developing countries.
- **Equitable access to sustainable development** by access to carbon space and time for development to developing countries. The Equity needs to be in the fair allocation of global mitigation burden and in the ability to pay (countries which have 'enjoyed' development are capable of paying and diverting funds towards low carbon emission pathways). The gap between equitable share of the global carbon space to the developing countries against the physical share that is accessible to them needs to be bridged by appropriate financial and technology development and transfer by the developed countries.

(xi) As the nomenclature suggests, equity indicators, are various indicative (not prescriptive) reference benchmarks, including but not limited to, the qualitative or quantitative information referred to by countries in their NDCs, and those in global assessments of distributional implications of global goals on temperature, mitigation, adaptation and finance (i.e. Article 2.1 (a) – (c) of the Paris Agreement), including historical responsibilities for increase in temperature, capacity to act due to development levels and sustainable development.

(xii) Indicators such as historical responsibility and leadership of developing countries find reference in specific provisions within the UNFCCC and its Paris Agreement. Therefore, these indicators are in fact a part of the UNFCCC climate change framework and not alien or new concepts. India emphasizes the need for expressly mentioning indicators in the decision text, as a unique opportunity to develop guidance on key criteria and metrics that evaluate the fairness and equity of climate contributions based on national circumstances and capabilities. It is reiterated that this guidance should be drawn from the criteria and metrics /

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[48] A statistical tool used to measure a country's overall achievement in its social and economic dimensions – based on the health of people, their level of education attainment, and their standard of living.

indicators already communicated voluntarily by Parties in their NDCs. Parties can thereafter decide if and how such indicators could be applied in subsequent GSTs. **[Emphasis Supplied]**

(xiii) To ensure better detailing of the discussion held on CBDR-RC and equity, and their operationalization in the GST process, their incorporation should be in more concrete terms. Identified or suggested indicators may be made a part of the long-term strategy to be developed on climate change. Such indicators (leadership by developed countries) are a vital / cross cutting issue to ensure ambition and in providing means of implementation and support in finance, technology development and transfer, and capacity building. An inclusive list of indicators to consider for the operationalization of equity in the GST could be as follows –

- responsibility for historical and current emissions as noted in the 3rd Preamble of the UNFCCC and acknowledged in the 2nd Preamble of Section III.A of decision 1/CP.16, and inputs of cumulative historical emissions;
- relationship of climate actions; responses and impacts with equitable access to sustainable development, as emphasized in the 8th Preamble of the Paris Agreement;
- leadership by developed countries in combating climate change and its adverse effects and in achieving low-emission and climate-resilient development as stated in Article 3.1 of the UNFCCC and Articles 4.3 and 4.4 of its Paris Agreement;
- development gaps between the global north and south;
- allotted carbon space;
- eradication poverty, food security, job creation etc.

(xiv) It has been established that some countries have much higher capacity to act than others, due to their level of development and access to technologies. Some countries have had the liberty to emit for a longer period of time, and thrive from the infrastructure they have been able to set up. The large volume of disproportionate historical emissions in the decades of unrestricted high carbon development is problematic from a climate justice perspective that recognizes the atmosphere as a shared common, to which all countries are entitled to in a fair and equitable way. However, the same countries who have benefitted many continue to insist on equal responsibility. Acknowledging Equity is essential to establishing trust, because carbon budget should be shared equitably and that cumulative emissions in excess of fair shares represent a form of appropriation of atmospheric commons. To ensure climate justice, as enshrined in the UNFCCC, it is imperative that developing countries emissions are not assessed by the same standards but progressively, while their developmental goals are met. Climate action efforts of developing countries should not be compared to developed countries.

(xv) The Outcome of GST should be based in Equity and should take care of the needs and special circumstances of developing countries, and how climate change impacts; actions; and responses, have a bearing on sustainable development and eradication of poverty.

(xvi) Despite equity having been recognized as the foremost political issue for the GST, in particular (during the adoption of the Paris Agreement Work Program (PAWP) at COP-24) and in the climate change regime over the years, the discussions have regressed than what it started with. Equity has not seen the detailing it requires in the GST process, especially in the outcome. The discussion at present is not balanced and leaves much work on the issues of political and existential importance. **[Emphasis Supplied]**

(xvii) India reiterates that various mechanisms have been put in place to enhance actions by countries through the systematic update of countries' actions, and the provision for a collective assessment of progress under GST. **It is important that these mechanisms keep the onus on developed countries, and that their efforts are based in Equity, as envisioned in the Paris Agreement**, in terms of actions pledged, and support to be provided to the developing countries.

(xviii) India iteratively maintains that Equity forms an intrinsic basis of the periodic collective assessment process under the GST (every five years), supported by the best available science on emission reduction gaps. Equity ensures that country Parties efforts to reduce emissions are seen in light of how much they have contributed to both, the stock of GHG emissions historically and currently; and likely future flows of emissions that they generate. **[Emphasis Supplied]**

(xix) India stresses that the GST assessment process, and the Output of the assessment, must consider Equity as the core parameter. Suggestions of dilution is to the extent that the word Equity is not even reflected in crucial sections such as Output renders a greater burden on developing countries like India to continue to stress and pitch Equity in every stocktake starting with 2023.

(xx) India wishes to see CBDR-RC operationalized in terms of –

- Visible leadership by developed countries in providing means of implementation and support in finance, technology development and transfer, and capacity building.
- Assessment of gaps in providing finance and support to developing countries (in finance, technology development and transfer, and capacity building).
- Adaptation efforts to be given equal importance in climate action, i.e. Equity must be applied to the implications of mitigation policies, as well as adaptation responses, to determine whether it is reducing the risks of climate change to the populations of developing countries.

(xxi) Equity in essence becomes the driver and enabler for increased action on climate change by all Parties. This will be particularly so if the GST results in political messages that highlight the need to enhance equity-oriented international cooperation on climate change. It provides the basis for ensuring that all Parties contribute their fair share to addressing climate change in accordance with their respective common but differentiated responsibilities under the UNFCCC and its Paris Agreement, in the light of their respective capabilities and different national circumstances, and gives developing countries the assurance that climate change actions can be done in a manner that is consistent with their respective sustainable development and poverty eradication objectives. For example, a key equity-related GST conclusion in 2023 could be a political message that recognizes that developed countries should have already peaked and must be on their way to becoming net negative, with peaking to come later for developing countries.[49]

3.10 Key areas for increasing ambition –

- **Increasing the current 2020 mitigation pledges / targets of Annex-1 countries** – The Paris Agreement has been entered into for enhancing the implementation of the Convention, including its objective, with the aim to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change, in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty. The Convention is subservient to the processes under the Paris Agreement. Most developed countries have demonstrated a lack of political will to engage and include obligations under the Convention in the climate ambition discourse and to increase their Pre-2020 pledges. Developed countries' collective (as well as individual) pledged effort is inadequate to cover the agreed 25 – 40 per cent range.
- **Enabling new or enhanced pledges by developing countries** – Closing the ambition gap will also require adequate additional efforts from the group of developing countries while respecting the principles CBDR-RC and equity. There is a need to identify what additional efforts are possible and what additional support would be required to enable developing countries to step up their efforts. Developed country Parties should make progress in scaling up climate finance more transparently to create an enabling environment for enhancing ambition in developing countries[50]. Developing countries must

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[49] The Synthesis Report of the Technical Dialogue of the First GST has observed that – *"global emissions are not in line with modelled global mitigation pathways consistent with the temperature goal of the Paris Agreement, and there is a rapidly narrowing window to raise ambition and implement existing commitments in order to limit warming to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels."*

The Synthesis Report recommends that, *"Action is needed to address the emission gap and implementation gap to increase the ambition of NDCs. Global peaking of emissions has not yet been reached but, while global peaking of GHG emissions should occur as soon as possible, **peaking will take longer for developing country Parties**. According to the IPCC AR6, global GHG emissions need to peak between 2020 and 2025 to limit warming to the Paris Agreement temperature goal. All Parties need to undertake rapid and deep reductions in GHG emissions in the decades after peaking."*

Source: Key finding 4; Technical dialogue of the first global stocktake Synthesis report by the co-facilitators on the technical dialogue; accessed at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/sb2023_09_adv.pdf

[50] The Synthesis Report of the Technical Dialogue of the First GST recommends that *"**Rapidly scaling up the mobilization of support for climate action in developing countries is necessary to meet urgent needs. Accelerated action is required to scale up climate finance from all sources.** Public finance alone is not sufficient to address the gap between financing needs and current finance flows, particularly in developing countries.*

***Access to climate finance in developing countries needs to be enhanced.** Simplified and expeditious access to climate finance can allow for more rapid deployment of urgently needed finance* provide information on what support would be needed for them to implement their pledges, including information on what additional support would be needed to enhance their ambition.

- **Finance (Revisiting Targets)** – A climate finance scale up is a key precondition to increase mitigation pledges in developing countries.[51] Adequate financial support for climate actions will ensure that lower-than-possible ambition in all climate actions does not occur in developing countries. The aim of this work should be to simultaneously increase ambition and support to the highest possible levels. It must be noted that Developed Country Parties must not defer *"enhancing ambition"* to post-2020, and leave the current Pre-2020 ambition gap untouched. It is stated that raising the ambition level of *action before 2020* is a pre-requisite to stay below the 1.5/2°C threshold. **[Emphasis Supplied]**
  - There is also a huge gap in the expectations of the developing countries and delivery of the promised Pre-2020 finance and other means of implementation by the developed countries. There is a need for new and additional finances provided by Annex II countries. While the self declaration by the Developed countries and the OECD data states that the promised amount of financial assistance is being mobilized. However, it is incorrect projection and if there is in fact new and additional finances provided over and above what is already promised i.e. beyond the ODA and other humanitarian assistance needs to be established. There is alleged double counting, and therefore more transparency and accountability in financial assistance should be provided.
  - Although mitigation action in developing countries would be accelerated by increasing new and additional climate finance, there is a need of a

while also better serving local needs, particularly in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.

Directing climate finance towards meaningful activities and continuing to strengthen monitoring, evaluation, and learning can more effectively meet needs, particularly in developing countries. If climate finance providers have clear evidence that climate finance is leading to results, they can be more confident in allocating funding and reducing access barriers.

Robust methodologies for tracking and assessing climate outcomes are important in this regard."

Source: Key finding 14; Technical dialogue of the first global stocktake Synthesis report by the co-facilitators on the technical dialogue; accessed at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/sb2023_09_adv.pdf

[51] The Synthesis Report of the Technical Dialogue of the First GST has observed that – *"scaled-up mobilization of support for climate action in developing countries entails strategically deploying international public finance, which remains a prime enabler for action, and continuing to enhance effectiveness, including access, ownership and impacts."*

Source: Key finding 14; Technical dialogue of the first global stocktake Synthesis report by the co-facilitators on the technical dialogue; accessed at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/sb2023_09_adv.pdf

plan on how to scale up finance commitments and to mobilise further resources to reach US $100 billion per year by 2020, committed by Developed countries.

- **Technology** – Parties need to recognise the importance and complexity of Environmentally Sound Technologies (ESTs), and their development and transfer in a barrier-free environment to achieve the objectives of the Convention, and to uphold its Paris Agreement. Parties are still debating how to leverage technology, to make the low carbon development pathways available to developing countries.[52] The Technology Mechanism does not have enough teeth to be tasked with setting out a plan. The Technology Executive Committee (TEC) could be asked to bring together their technology roadmap work into a technology needs mapping across developing countries, taking into account, *inter alia*, existing Technology Needs Assessments, additional surveys and research initiatives of Parties. The involvement of the private sector will have to be explored, so that the legal issues of IPR do not conflict the transfer of technology.
- **Capacity Building** – Consistent with the principle of equitable access to sustainable development, institutional arrangements need to be delivered to ensure that all developing countries receive the capacity building support for the operationalization of their low carbon development plans. The developed countries must ensure that the developing countries are fully and adequately supported within a clear, transparent, coherent and predictable framework for capacity building and capability enhancement.[53]
- **Multilateralism over unilateralism** – Any unilateral measures in the name of climate change responses are discriminatory towards developing countries and violate principles of equity and CBDR-RC and the UNFCCC provisions. Such proposals must be strongly opposed, as they are detrimental to multilateral cooperation. Parties must continue to work towards common priorities in a sustainable manner minimizing environmental and climatic

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[52] The Synthesis Report of the Technical Dialogue of the First GST has observed that – *"existing cleaner technologies need to be rapidly deployed, together with accelerated innovation, development and transfer of new technologies, to support the needs of developing countries."*

Source: Key finding 16; Technical dialogue of the first global stocktake Synthesis report by the co-facilitators on the technical dialogue; accessed at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/sb2023_09_adv.pdf

[53] The Synthesis Report of the Technical Dialogue of the First GST has observed that – *"capacity-building is foundational to achieving broad-ranging and sustained climate action and requires effective country-led and needs-based cooperation to ensure capacities are enhanced and retained over time at all levels."*

The Synthesis Report also recommends that *"Developed countries need to increase the level of support provided for strategic capacity-building to developing countries to address locally determined needs."*

Source: Key finding 17; Technical dialogue of the first global stocktake Synthesis report by the co-facilitators on the technical dialogue; accessed at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/sb2023_09_adv.pdf

deterioration. In this regard, the concerns for the global “commons” has been in the forefront of India’s developmental efforts, including thrust on renewable energy, smart cities, sustainable transport, climate change resilient agricultural practices, better irrigation and water conservation measures. Hereinafter, Parties must assert that due consideration be given to the special circumstances of developing countries, including their unique vulnerabilities; and development priorities like eradication of poverty, food security, energy access, etc.

India reserves the right to make additional submissions and present further views on the relevant issues connected with the Global Stocktake, if required.

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Annex – I

Draft GST1 decision text for consideration by CMA-5

A. Preamble

Recalling Articles 3, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.7, 4.8, 4.9, 4.10, 5, 6, 12.1, 12.2, 12.3 of the Convention and Articles 2, 3, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.8, 4.9, 4.13, 4.15, 7.1, 9.1, 9.5, 9.7, 10.6, 13.7, 13.9, 13.14, 13.15 of its Paris Agreement

Also recalling decisions Paras 99-101 of 1/CP.21, [placeholder for relevant COP decisions]

Further recalling decisions 19/CMA.1 [placeholder for relevant CMA decisions]

1. *Affirms* that the purpose of the global stocktake (GST) referred to in Article 14 of the Paris Agreement is to periodically take stock of the implementation of the Paris Agreement to assess the collective progress towards achieving the purpose of the Agreement and its long-term goals, with the aim to strengthen global response to climate change, in context of sustainable development and poverty eradication; and to inform Parties in updating and enhancing, in a nationally determined manner, their actions and support in accordance with the relevant principles and provisions of the Agreement as well as in enhancing international cooperation for climate action.

2. *Agrees* that the global stocktake referred to in Article 14 of the Paris Agreement shall consider mitigation, adaptation and the means of implementation and support, in the light of equity and the best available science, taking into account issues relating to addressing the adverse consequences of loss and damage, just and equitable transition of the workforce, in context of impact of implementation of response measures, and economic diversification in accordance with the relevant principles and provisions of the Paris Agreement.

B. Context and cross-cutting considerations

1. *Agrees* that the outcome of the GST should focus on taking stock of the implementation of the Paris Agreement to assess collective progress in achieving the purpose of the Paris Agreement and its long-term goals, identify gaps in the implementation of the Paris Agreement that pose challenges to enhancing collective progress and how they will be closed in the light of equity and the best available science, indicate lessons learned and good practices to improve collective progress, not have individual-Parties focus, and may include policy-relevant but not policy-prescriptive assessment of collective progress and key messages on opportunities and challenges that Parties can use to inform the updating and enhancement of their successive climate actions and support and further international cooperation, while respecting the nationally-determined nature of Parties' actions under the Paris Agreement.

2. *Agrees* that Equity will guide how Parties will consider fairness and ambition of their actions and commitments, in a nationally determined manner, in the implementation of the Paris Agreement and its principles and provisions.

3. *Also agrees* that Equity will promote more ambitious action and support on climate change, collectively under the Paris Agreement[54].

C. Collective progress towards achieving the purpose and long-term goals of the Paris Agreement, including under Article 2, paragraph 1 (a-c), in the light of equity and the best available science, and informing Parties in updating and enhancing, in a nationally determined manner, action and support

1. *Decides* that GST should, in accordance with the relevant principles and provisions of the Paris Agreement and in the light of equity and on the basis of the best available science, collectively assess Parties progress towards achieving the purpose and the long term goals of the Paris Agreement; in a comprehensive and facilitative manner, and considering;

(a) Mitigation

In context of;

- revisiting the Pre-2020 emission reduction targets by Developed Country Parties and evaluating the implementation of the roadmap on achieving emission reduction target of at least 40% compared to their 1990 levels by 2020 by removing conditionality and taking additional actions.
- responsibility for historical and current emissions as noted in the 3rd

[54] The Synthesis Report of the Technical Dialogue of the First GST has observed that – ***A focus on inclusion and equity can increase ambition in climate action and support."*** **[Emphasis Supplied]**

Source: Key finding 3; Technical dialogue of the first global stocktake Synthesis report by the co-facilitators on the technical dialogue; accessed at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/sb2023_09_adv.pdf

Preamble of the Convention and acknowledged in the 2nd Preamble of Section III.A of decision 1/CP.16, and inputs of cumulative historical emissions;

- relationship of climate actions; responses and impacts with equitable access to sustainable development, as emphasized in the 8th Preamble of the Paris Agreement;
- leadership by developed countries in combating climate change and its adverse effects and in achieving low-emission and climate-resilient development as stated in Article 3.1 of the Convention and Articles 4.3 and 4.4 of its Paris Agreement;
- fair share of carbon space;
- transition to sustainable lifestyles and sustainable patterns of consumption and production, with developed country Parties taking the lead towards demand-side measures.

(b) Adaptation

In context of;

- efforts towards reducing the increasing adverse impacts, risks and vulnerabilities associated with climate change;
- enhance support provided for adaptation action and international cooperation on adaptation efforts;
- needs of developing country Parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change;
- assess adaptation needs;
- building socioeconomic and ecological systems resilience, including through economic diversification and sustainable management of natural resources as envisaged under the Paris Agreement (Article 7.9 (e)), instead of system transformation narrative;
- efforts to eradicate poverty, food security, job creation, gender-responsiveness;
- options for sharing of good practices and lessons learned, particularly from actions with the potential to enhance the implementation of adaptation and those with mitigation co-benefits;

(c) Means of implementation and support

In context of;

- mobilization and provision of support, in furtherance to Article 2; including paragraph 1(c), Article 9**,** Article 10; paragraph 6, Article 11; paragraph 3, and Article 13; paragraphs 9 and 10 of the Paris Agreement;
- adequacy of finance, technology transfer and development, and capacity-

building support to developing countries in a holistic manner, including their sustained implementation, under the existing finance, technology and capacity building mechanisms;

In terms of;

(i) Finance

- review of USD 100 billion per year by 2020 (by 2025) goal;
- setting up a New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG), prior to 2025;
- acknowledgement to strengthen and urgently scale up climate support, taking into account needs and priorities of developing countries;
- long-term climate finance and its continuation beyond 2025, in furtherance to continuous and enhanced international support be provided to developing country Parties for the implementation of Article 7; paragraphs 7, 9, 10 and 11, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 9, 10 and 11 of the Paris Agreement;
- new and additional finances;
- global assessments of distributional implications of global goals on temperature, mitigation, adaptation and finance, including historical responsibilities for increase in temperature, capacity to act due to development levels and sustainable development;

(ii) Technology Transfer and Development

- science-based information on whether the Parties are on a low-carbon and climate-resilient pathway, or do they require a course correction;
- measure and establish how much technology transfer the developing countries actually see, and what kind of finance is being routed into technology transfer;
- transfer and deployment of ESTs to developing countries and allocation of resources for the removal of barriers in accessing such technologies;
- incentives for investment in low-carbon and low-emissions development technologies;
- take national circumstances in account, and not recommend certain least-cost mitigation options, such as uniform carbon pricing globally, which are based on the assumption that the requisite technologies are available to all Parties;
- involving private-sector may also be considered;

(iii) Capacity Building

- need for capacity – building for policy coherence and integrated approaches to sustainable development;

- institutional arrangement to ensure all developing countries receive capacity building and capability enhancement support for designing and operationalization of their long-term low carbon development plans;
- scaling up of effective capacity building actions under the Convention and its Paris Agreement to support developing countries in undertaking climate actions;
- identification of capacity building needs of developing countries;
- significant opportunities for enhanced international cooperation on climate change capacity building;

(d) Efforts related to loss and damage

In context of;

- funding arrangements for loss and damage by taking into account historical and current contributions
- disbursement of funds based on the obligations on the part of developed nations as provisioned under the Convention and its Paris Agreement;
- allocation of funds based on CBDR-RC and without passing the burden of financing climate action on to developing countries;
- significant scale-up of existing catastrophe-triggered financial instruments, while designing creative new instruments that incentivize resilience-building (particular focus on early-warning systems);

(e) Efforts related to response measures

In context of;

- lack of energy development and security;
- technology and climate finance as important concerns under the climate discourse;
- just and equitable transition, in accordance with nationally defined development priorities – which must include –
  - focus on technologies and R&D that permit use of cleaner coal (or other fossil fuels) to support [India's] clean energy transition;
  - mobilizing affordable finance at scale from wide variety of sources;
  - public finance to play crucial role for mobilizing and leveraging private capital;

- scaling up finance with more widespread use of blended finance;
- cooperation and capacity building and joint training programs in emerging green sectors;
- sharing of knowledge and best practices to adopt green technologies.

D. Enhancing international cooperation for climate action

1. *Underscores* the importance of an enhanced understanding of what is fair and ambitious in terms of collective climate action;

2. *Calls for* greater multilateral cooperation in furtherance to the principles and provisions of the Convention and its Paris Agreement, as well as burden sharing by distributing effort and responsibility equitably;

3. *Recognizes* the needs and special circumstances of developing countries as well as;

4. *Identifies* the extent to which international cooperation takes place on climate change impacts, actions, and responses under the Paris Agreement, and has a bearing on developing countries' achievement of sustainable development and eradication of poverty.

5. *Reiterates* that the areas of international cooperation and facilitation to enhance understanding, action and support are already identified under the Paris Agreement in terms of:

(a) Sharing information, good practices, experiences and lessons learned, including, as appropriate, as these relate to science, planning, policies and implementation in relation to adaptation actions;

(b) Strengthening institutional arrangements, including those under the Convention that serve this Agreement, to support the synthesis of relevant information and knowledge, and the provision of technical support and guidance to Parties;

(c) Strengthening scientific knowledge on climate, including research, systematic observation of the climate system and early warning systems, in a manner that informs climate services and supports decision-making;

(d) Assisting developing country Parties in identifying effective adaptation practices, adaptation needs, priorities, support provided and received for adaptation actions and efforts, and challenges and gaps, in a manner consistent with encouraging good practices; and

(e) Improving the effectiveness and durability of adaptation and loss and damage actions through –

- Early warning systems;
- Emergency preparedness;
- Slow onset events;
- Events that may involve irreversible and permanent loss and damage;
- Comprehensive risk assessment and management;
- Risk insurance facilities, climate risk pooling and other insurance solutions;
- Non-economic losses; and
- Resilience of communities, livelihoods and ecosystems.

E. Guidance and way forward

1. *Establishing* linkages and synergy with existing institutional arrangements and subsidiary bodies under the Convention; being informed by the work of the existing subsidiary bodies and processes to avoid duplication;

2. *Developing* recommendations to the COP on further guidance on the institutional arrangements under the Convention; and improving the scale, scope, speed and delivery of means of implementation;

3. *Sharing* experiences and taking stock of the progress by institutional arrangements on accelerating the implementation of past decisions, supported by means of implementation and support in terms of finance, technology development and transfer, and capacity-building by Developed Country Parties;

4. *Promoting* cross-level and cross-functional collaboration among UNFCCC entities, organizations, (and if outside UNFCCC processes are to be encouraged then they must respect the UNFCCC process); including determination of involvement of non-party and other stakeholders at the national, regional, local, and private sector / corporate levels.

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